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2 **Supplementary Information for**

3 **Oil and Aid Revenue Produce Equal Demands for Accountability as Taxes in Ghana and**  
4 **Uganda**

5 **Brandon de la Cuesta, Helen V. Milner, Daniel Nielson, and Stephen Knack**

6 **Brandon de la Cuesta.**

7 **E-mail: [brandon.delacuesta@princeton.edu](mailto:brandon.delacuesta@princeton.edu)**

8 **This PDF file includes:**

9     Supplementary text

10    Tables S1 to S109

11    References for SI reference citations

## Supporting Information Text

### 1. Survey Language And Design

**A. Assignment to Treatment.** Subjects were randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions in which they were provided with information about government revenue. While simple randomization would not lead to biased estimates in expectation, the presence of non-trivial differences in respondent experience with local government at the constituency-level presented an opportunity to improve the efficiency of the differences estimator through the use of a block randomization algorithm. This algorithm was designed such that, within our primary sampling unit and thus at all higher-level geographic units—including, importantly, the constituency—there was perfect (or, when the number of respondents was not divisible by four, near-perfect) balance between our experimental conditions.

The donation measure prompt was as follows:

#### B. Donation Prompt.

“There are several organizations in [Ghana/Uganda] that work to make it easier for ordinary [Ghanaians/Ugandans] to see how development funds are spent. At the beginning of the survey, we gave you [6 cedis/1,000 shillings] to compensate you for the time it has taken to answer our questions. Now, we would like to know if you would like to donate to one of those organizations. You may choose to donate to [Action Aid Ghana/Uganda, Transparency International Ghana/Uganda, or IMANI, a research organization that analyzes government budgets, policies and initiatives/a third organization of your choosing]. If you would like to donate, please give me the amount of money you would like to donate and which organization you would like to donate to. If you do donate, your money will be used to help reduce corruption and improve the lives of ordinary Ghanaians/Ugandans.”

### 2. Index Construction

To investigate the effects of government revenues, we construct three separate indexes for the mass surveys, behavior, action, and expected benefits, and two indexes for the MP surveys, influence and expected benefits.

Our first index focuses on the actions citizens might take to monitor and sanction the government for its use of the revenues; **ACTION** includes questions about supporting and paying for an independent agency to monitor the government, signing a petition to create such an agency, sending an SMS about this petition, contacting their village elder or MP or local official if funds are used badly, and donating part of their incentive money for this agency. The second index involves whether and how much citizens think the revenues are likely to be misappropriated by the government; **MISAPPROPRIATION** includes questions about the probability the funds are used for clientelism, whether subjects can see how the funds are spent, and whether their MP can see how they are spent. The third index tracks whether citizens believe the funds will be used to help the public versus helping political leaders and the government; **BENEFITS** includes questions about whether people believe the funds will be spread equally over the districts (versus concentrated in ruling government ones), whether the funds will benefit ordinary people like themselves, whether they will benefit their family, and whether they will benefit their community. We include the exact wording of individual questions in Section B of the appendix.

For the MPs, we create two indexes since their survey had to be much shorter. The first index parallels the one for the public focusing on benefits from the revenues and whether they serve the public; **BENEFITS** includes questions about whether the revenues will help their family, their community, or the economy. The second focuses on how much control and influence over the revenues the MPs believe they have; **INFLUENCE** covers questions about whether the MP thinks tracking the funds is important, if the MP can direct the funds to his district, if the MP feels he has control over how the funds are spent, and if the MP can observe how the funds are spent by the government. The exact wording of individual questions can be found in Section 1B of the appendix. These indexes then form our main dependent variables.

We create both the citizen and MP indexes by calculating the average of the non-missing values for the set of questions in each index. Approximately 4% of respondents in the mass surveys did not answer or replied “don’t know” to individual questions across the three indexes. To mitigate concerns that these missing values might bias the overall index for the mass sample, we imputed five datasets using the **Amelia** package in R. The MP survey did not have a large number of missing values. We also estimated the mass models without imputed values and find substantively similar results as shown in Sections 5 and 6 in the appendix.

**A. Mass Surveys.** We provide below the exact question wording for individual questions in each index:

#### Action Index

- 1. Create Agency (post\_createagency):** An agency to do this could be created, but it would require all Ghanaians to pay special taxes in order to create it. Would you be willing to, HYPOTHETICALLY, pay a SMALL TAX so that this agency could be created? **1=Yes, 0=No**
- 2. Willing to Send SMS (post\_sms):** Would you be willing to send an SMS saying that you would like to create an agency to track how the money from 0 will be spent? Your message will be presented along with other messages to your Member of Parliament. Standard SMS fees apply. You may send this message at your earliest convenience. Sending the message is entirely voluntary. **ENUMERATOR:** If they don’t have a phone themselves, you can tell them that they can

	Ghana		Uganda	
Total <i>N</i>	3566		3186	
	Frequ.	Share	Frequ.	Share
Signed Anonymously	295	0.0827	251	0.0788
Signed With Name	1879	0.5269	1589	0.4987
Sent SMS	1148	0.3269	1514	0.4863
Donated (Binary)	1715	0.4809	1833	0.5753
Donate (Amount)		2.0987		385.6999
Likely or Very Likely to Contact Elder	1628	0.46	1871	0.5936
Likely or Very Likely to Contact Local	1786	0.5051	1687	0.5359
Likely or Very Likely to Contact MP	1242	0.3505	1259	0.4022

**Table S1. Frequencies and Proportions of Subjects Taking Action and Expressing Willingness to Take Action to Monitor Revenue. Results show that large proportions of respondents are willing to take various forms of costly political action to monitor spending or to strengthen transparency institutions.**

use a friend's phone. The important thing is that THE MESSAGE INCLUDE THE NUMBER YOU WROTE ON THE PAPER FOR THEM. Remember that you are only asking if they are willing to send the message, you are not forcing them to send it or standing there until they send it? **1=Yes, 0=No**

3. **Sent SMS (sms\_sent)**: Indicator after post\_sms for sms sent.

4. **Donated Binary (post\_donate\_bin)**: There are several organizations in Ghana that work to make it easier for ordinary Ghanaians to see how development funds are spent. At the beginning of the survey, we gave you 6 cedis to compensate you for the time it has taken to answer our questions. Now, we would like to know if you would like to donate to one of those organizations. You may choose to donate to Action Aid Ghana, Ghana Integrity Initiative (also known as Transparency International Ghana), IMANI, a research organization that analyzes government budgets, policies and initiatives. If you would like to donate, please give me the amount of money you would like to donate and which organization you would like to donate to. ENUMERATOR: How much money did the respondent GIVE you? You are to enter ONLY how much money the respondent has actually GIVEN you, not how much they say they are willing to donate. If they do not donate any money, type "0" as the answer. Also, make sure to let them know this is entirely voluntary. **1= donation greater than zero, 0 otherwise**

5. **Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary) (post\_wtp\_bin)**: How much would you be willing to pay PER MONTH in new taxes for this agency to be created? **1= donation greater than zero, 0 otherwise**

6. **Signed Petition (any) (post\_sign\_any)** ENUMERATOR: If the respondent signed the petition, how many signatures were on the petition when this respondent signed it? ENUMERATOR: Enter -5 if the person did not sign the petition

7. **Pr(Contact Village Elder) (post\_contact\_elder)**: If the money is not spent on the things you think are most important, how likely are you to do each of the following... Contact local opinion leader. **1=Yes, 0=No**

8. **Pr(Contact Local Official) (post\_contact\_local)** If the money is not spent on the things you think are most important, how likely are you to do each of the following... Contact local assemblyman/woman/LC3. **1=Yes, 0=No**

9. **Pr(Contact MP) (post\_contact\_mp)** If the money is not spent on the things you think are most important, how likely are you to do each of the following... Contact your Member of Parliament. **1=Yes, 0=No**

#### **Expected Benefits Index**

1. **Funds Benefit Family (post\_help\_family)**: How much do you think the money from 0 will help the following people? ... **Your Family** (1=Not at all, 4 = A Lot)

2. **Funds Benefit Community (post\_help\_community)**: The money we mentioned before may be spent in many different ways. We are now going to ask you some questions about the revenue. After each, we would like to know if you think they are very likely to happen, somewhat likely to happen, not very likely to happen, or not at all likely to happen. ... **The money will be spent on projects that will make ordinary people's lives better.** (1 = Very Likely, 5 = Likely)

3. **Funds Benefit Ordinary People (post\_helppub)**: The money we mentioned before may be spent in many different ways. We are now going to ask you some questions about the revenue. After each, we would like to know if you think they are very likely to happen, somewhat likely to happen, not very likely to happen, or not at all likely to happen. **The money will be spent on projects that will make ordinary people's lives better** (1 = Very Likely, 5 = Likely)

4. **Funds Split Equally (post\_where\_spend\_equal)** Now, we would like to ask you some questions about WHERE you think the money will be spent. Do you think it will spent: (1 == Equally among all Ghanaian / Ugandan districts). Binary variable.

#### **Misappropriation Index**

1. **Pr(Used for Clientelism) (post\_rent)** The money we mentioned before may be spent in many different ways. We are now going to ask you some questions about the revenue. After each, we would like to know if you think they are very likely to happen, somewhat likely to happen, not very likely to happen, or not at all likely to happen ... **Politicians will use the money to get people to vote for them.** (1 = Very Unlikely, 6 = Very Likely)

2. **Pr(Spending Hidden) (post\_opaque)** This is the transformation of post\_transparent that makes higher = less transparent, done to harmonize for misappropriation index. The money we mentioned before may be spent in many different ways. We are now going to ask you some questions about the revenue. After each, we would like to know if you think they are very likely to happen, somewhat likely to happen, not very likely to happen, or not at all likely to happen... **People like me will be able to learn how it was spent.** (1 = Very Unlikely , 6 = Very Likely) (We inverse this coding for analysis)

3. **Pr(MP Observes Spending) (post\_mpknow)** The money we mentioned before may be spent in many different ways. We are now going to ask you some questions about the revenue. After each, we would like to know if you think they are very likely to happen, somewhat likely to happen, not very likely to happen, or not at all likely to happen... **My MP will know how this money is spent.** (1 = Very Unlikely, 6 = Very Likely)

121 **B. MP Surveys.** We provide below the exact question wording for individual questions in each index. We dichotomized the  
122 original ordinal values for the construction of the indexes and analysis, but the main findings for both the benefit and  
123 misappropriation indexes are robust to using the original values.

124 **Benefit Index**

- 125 1. **Funds benefit family (post\_help\_family)** How much do you think that 0 will use the money from 1 to help the  
126 following things/people: ... **Your family** (1=Not at all, 4 = A Lot)
- 127 2. **Funds benefit community (post\_help\_community)** How much do you think that 0 will use the money from 1 to  
128 help the following things/people: ... **Your community** (1=Not at all, 4 = A Lot)
- 129 3. **Funds benefit economy (post\_help\_economy)** How much do you think that 0 will use the money from 1 to help  
130 the following things/people: ... **The Ghanaian/Ugandan Economy** (1=Not at all, 4 = A Lot)

131 **Influence Index**

- 132 1. **Important to Track Funds (post\_trackimp)** Some people have said that they would like to create a special  
133 government agency in charge of tracking how the five trillion shillings in 0 money is spent by 1. How important do you  
134 think it is to track how this money is spent? (1=Not at all important 4= Very important)
- 135 2. **Bring Projects to District (post\_funds\_work)** When the 0 money arrives, I will be able to work with the 1 to  
136 bring projects to my constituency? (1=Strongly Disagree, 4 = Strongly Agree)
- 137 3. **Influence Funds (post\_funds\_influence)** When the 0 money arrives, I will be able to influence how the money is  
138 spent? (1=Strongly Disagree, 4 = Strongly Agree)
- 139 4. **Observe Spending (post\_funds\_see)** When the 0 money arrives, I will be able to see how the money is spent?  
140 (1=Strongly Disagree, 4 = Strongly Agree)

141 **3. Discussion of Consistency with Pre-Analysis Plan**

- 142 1. **Relabeling Indexes.** The pre-analysis plan (PAP) discusses “the spending effect, the accountability effect, and the  
143 repression effect” as mechanisms through which the resource curse should operate. In the manuscript, these mechanisms are  
144 relabeled and outcome items are bundled into three corresponding indexes for “benefit,” “action,” and “misappropriation,”  
145 respectively. The names were changed for better communication of the indexes, though they all remain consistent  
146 conceptually.
- 147 2. **Number of Comparisons.** The pre-analysis plan anticipated “six comparisons: aid/government with oil, aid/government  
148 with taxes, aid/NGOs with oil, aid/NGOs with taxes, aid/government with aid/NGOs, and taxes with oil.” Because  
149 there were no statistically or substantively significant differences between the three government-directed revenue sources,  
150 we bundled the three together for comparisons to the NGO aid condition to improve statistical power for the comparison.  
151 The three comparisons of NGO aid with taxes, government aid and oil produce qualitatively similar results to the  
152 aggregated results reported in the manuscript.
- 153 3. **Hierarchy of Hypothesized Effects.** In the pre-analysis plan, Table 1 displays our hypotheses for the hierarchy of  
154 citizens’ willingness to take action (accountability); expected benefits (spending); and anticipated misappropriation of  
155 the money to corruption, clientelism, and intimidation (repression). The five paragraphs preceding Table 1 indicate our  
156 expectations for how the revenues would motivate action and for how the effects of revenue from the different sources  
157 would be perceived by citizens, with aid from NGOs inducing the most action, the strongest perceptions of benefits, and  
158 the least fears of misappropriation, followed by taxes, then government aid, then oil. The title of Table 1, “Expectations of  
159 Citizen Responses Across Several Outcomes,” may inadvertently confuse the directionality of expectations for the different  
160 rows (due to the fact that action and benefits are in a positive direction and misappropriation negative), but our intent  
161 as researchers was to communicate a hierarchy of anticipated treatment effects for the outcomes suggesting that citizens  
162 would be willing to act to promote accountability more for NGO aid than for taxes, for taxes more than aid through  
163 government, and for government aid more than oil. The same ordering for spending/benefits: NGO aid would be expected  
164 to bring the greatest benefits, followed by taxes, then government aid, then oil. Similar for misappropriation/repression:  
165 least misappropriation for NGO aid, then more for taxes, more still for government aid, then most for oil. Our data  
166 generally fits this pattern but we do not report this.
- 167 4. **Least Squares Regression Analysis.** The pre-analysis plan states that treatment effects would be assessed for  
168 “the outcomes of interest clustered according to the three categories of repression, accountability, and spending.” The  
169 manuscript follows this plan. The PAP continues: “We will begin the analysis using simple difference-in-means tests.”  
170 Again, the manuscript executes the PAP as planned. However, the PAP included an ambiguity in the following statement:  
171 “We will supplement the difference-in-means results with robustness checks using logit and ordered probit regression  
172 analysis using standard demographic covariates as controls.” Given that all three outcomes—misappropriation/repression,  
173 action/accountability, and benefits/spending—are continuous indexes, least-squares regression is the appropriate analysis

tool rather than logit or ordered probit, which are instead appropriate for the individual items when analysis is disaggregated. For the sake of simplicity we also present here the least-squares results for individual items, but estimates are robust to the use of logit and ordered probit models. We supplement the main regression results with analysis performed using randomization inference.

5. **Subgroup Analysis.** The PAP anticipated the following subgroup analyses:

- (a) Perceptions of high vs. low corruption
- (b) Oil districts vs. non-oil districts
- (c) Districts with high vs. low aid receipts
- (d) Political party affiliation
- (e) Ethnic affiliation (in President's tribe or not)

The manuscript text discusses and the appendix reports the results of all of these subgroup analyses save the subset dividing by aid receipts. As it happened, the data on aid receipts by district was not sufficiently complete to enable this subgroup analysis.

After we analyzed the results and encountered the robust null finding for taxes compared to government aid and oil revenue, we thought it advisable to explore a wider array of subgroups to learn if treatment effects might be encountered in additional subsets. This analysis was performed to pursue greater robustness checking. Thus, in addition to the planned subgroup analysis, we performed further subsetting for the following:

- (f) Approval of central government initiatives
- (g) Experience paying taxes
- (h) Gender
- (i) Levels of trust in government
- (j) Poverty level
- (k) Level of trust in NGOs

6. **Three Indexes.** In the section on Data Analysis, the PAP anticipated indices for four families of outcomes: Action, Consequences, Beneficiaries, and Contact. In retrospect, we saw this as inconsistent with the many other passages in the PAP focused on the three outcomes of accountability, repression, and spending, which are labeled in the manuscript as Action, Misappropriation, and Benefits, respectively. In the manuscript we thus reverted to the simpler, threefold categorization and folded the "Contact" outcome items into the Action index to remain consistent with the broader intent of the PAP throughout.

7. **Index Construction.** The survey items employed in the construction of each index are listed above in section 2. In general, the index items used follow the anticipated items in the PAP with some exceptions, discussed here. For the Action index, as noted, we folded the planned Contact items into it to remain consistent with the rest of the PAP. All of the anticipated items are included save subjects' beliefs about the importance of tracking the funding, their self-reported propensity to march in a demonstration, or their self-reported likelihood to change which party they vote for.

The Benefits index focuses on subjects' perceptions of the probability that the money would produce public goods generally, including the planned PAP items inquiring about perceptions that the revenue's anticipated effects on subjects' individual lives, families and communities, and adding an item focused on perceptions that the benefits would be distributed equally among all citizens. The Benefits index omits the items for anticipated help to the government, the governing party, and the economy generally.

Finally, the Misappropriation index focused on possible use of the funds for clientelistic purposes and on tracking the money, including items for whether citizens believed the money would be used for politicians to buy votes in elections (clientelism), whether the spending would be hidden from citizens, and whether MPs can know how the money is spent. The index omits items focused on subject projections that funding will be used for repression, perceptions that the money will become a prize to be won, and perceptions that it will help opposition parties. Changes were made to the indexes from the pre-analysis plan because of ceiling effects detected in the omitted item or due to failure of the item to load consistently with the other items in the index construction.

#### 4. Mass Surveys, Balance Tests

We conducted balance tests for each treatment group across a range of pre-treatment covariates for those respondents in the mass surveys who passed the manipulation check. As illustrated below, our randomization resulted in approximately an equal number of treatment groups and balance across the demographic covariates. The few statistically significant results do not survive a multiple testing correction and are consistent with successful randomization.

**Table S2. Uganda Mass Survey (Passed Manipulation Check): Balance Tests with Enum FEs (Tax, Aid, Oil)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Tax	Tax	Aid	Aid	Oil	Oil
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.007 (0.005)	−0.004 (0.005)	0.008* (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.001 (0.005)
Employed	0.134 (0.125)	0.132 (0.128)	−0.057 (0.117)	−0.064 (0.121)	−0.108 (0.121)	−0.106 (0.124)
Female	−0.028 (0.110)	−0.012 (0.113)	−0.027 (0.103)	−0.080 (0.106)	0.064 (0.106)	0.095 (0.109)
Rural	0.019 (0.151)	−0.040 (0.156)	−0.033 (0.142)	−0.069 (0.147)	−0.126 (0.146)	−0.054 (0.151)
Education	−0.032 (0.038)	−0.034 (0.039)	0.006 (0.035)	−0.001 (0.036)	0.003 (0.036)	0.016 (0.037)
Non-Coethnic		0.203 (0.219)		−0.021 (0.195)		−0.221 (0.197)
Low Trust		−0.148 (0.143)		−0.026 (0.135)		−0.007 (0.138)
Low Approval		0.224* (0.132)		−0.075 (0.123)		−0.091 (0.126)
Oil Region		−0.203 (0.342)		0.084 (0.336)		0.020 (0.337)
Gov Supporter		−0.142 (0.133)		0.177 (0.128)		−0.124 (0.129)
High Corruption		−0.212 (0.151)		0.131 (0.137)		0.052 (0.141)
Constant	−13.328 (535.411)	−14.392 (882.743)	14.464 (882.743)	14.507 (882.743)	−12.470 (324.744)	−13.291 (535.411)
Observations	2,109	2,012	2,109	2,012	2,109	2,012
Log Likelihood	−1,093.188	−1,043.589	−1,209.790	−1,149.055	−1,162.539	−1,104.862
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,306.377	2,219.179	2,539.579	2,430.110	2,445.078	2,341.724

*Notes:* Estimates are based on logistic regression with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S3. Uganda Mass Survey (Passed Manipulation Check): Balance Tests with Enum FEs (NGO)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	NGO	NGO
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)
Employed	0.042 (0.117)	0.048 (0.120)
Female	−0.010 (0.103)	−0.0005 (0.106)
Rural	0.137 (0.142)	0.153 (0.147)
Education	0.017 (0.035)	0.015 (0.036)
Non-Coethnic		0.065 (0.200)
Low Trust		0.163 (0.131)
Low Approval		−0.031 (0.122)
Oil Region		0.079 (0.342)
Gov Supporter		0.069 (0.125)
High Corruption		−0.002 (0.138)
Constant	−12.755 (324.744)	−12.925 (324.744)
Observations	2,109	2,012
Log Likelihood	−1,216.744	−1,158.636
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,553.488	2,449.272

*Notes:* Estimates are based on logistic regression with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.



**Table S4. Ghana Mass Survey (Passed Manipulation Check): Balance Tests with Enum FEs (Tax, Aid, Oil)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Tax	Tax	Aid	Aid	Oil	Oil
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Age	−0.005 (0.003)	−0.001 (0.004)	−0.003 (0.003)	−0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Employed	0.121 (0.110)	0.031 (0.120)	0.022 (0.103)	0.149 (0.117)	−0.123 (0.116)	−0.123 (0.116)
Female	−0.079 (0.100)	−0.048 (0.110)	0.063 (0.093)	0.006 (0.105)	−0.139 (0.107)	−0.139 (0.107)
Rural	0.013 (0.113)	−0.003 (0.125)	0.074 (0.107)	0.013 (0.121)	−0.042 (0.122)	−0.042 (0.122)
Education	0.026 (0.031)	0.031 (0.035)	−0.048 (0.030)	−0.022 (0.034)	0.006 (0.034)	0.006 (0.034)
Non-Coethnic		−0.275 (0.297)		0.058 (0.305)	0.114 (0.305)	0.114 (0.305)
Low Trust		0.074 (0.123)		−0.145 (0.118)	−0.066 (0.120)	−0.066 (0.120)
Low Approval		0.146 (0.146)		0.366*** (0.141)	−0.157 (0.139)	−0.157 (0.139)
Oil Region		−0.170 (0.304)		0.057 (0.273)	0.304 (0.297)	0.304 (0.297)
Gov Supporter		0.221* (0.129)		0.072 (0.124)	−0.077 (0.127)	−0.077 (0.127)
High Corruption		0.225 (0.140)		−0.219 (0.138)	0.195 (0.138)	0.195 (0.138)
Constant	−14.460 (441.085)	−14.631 (440.625)	−13.286 (267.553)	−14.518 (440.294)	0.113 (1.066)	0.113 (1.066)
Observations	2,607	2,108	2,607	2,108	2,108	2,108
Log Likelihood	−1,354.408	−1,125.241	−1,486.825	−1,193.235	−1,170.801	−1,170.801
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,784.816	2,334.483	3,049.649	2,470.469	2,425.602	2,425.602

*Notes:* Estimates are based on logistic regression with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S5. Ghana Mass Survey (Passed Manipulation Check): Balance Tests with Enum FEs (NGO)**

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	NGO	NGO
	(1)	(2)
Age	0.004 (0.003)	0.004 (0.004)
Employed	−0.087 (0.101)	−0.054 (0.115)
Female	0.181* (0.093)	0.172 (0.105)
Rural	0.017 (0.107)	0.029 (0.120)
Education	0.006 (0.030)	−0.013 (0.034)
Non-Coethnic		0.096 (0.299)
Low Trust		0.143 (0.119)
Low Approval		−0.339** (0.137)
Oil Region		−0.174 (0.282)
Gov Supporter		−0.203 (0.127)
High Corruption		−0.181 (0.139)
Constant	−0.307 (1.030)	−0.118 (1.063)
Observations	2,607	2,108
Log Likelihood	−1,492.737	−1,193.692
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,061.474	2,471.384

*Notes:* Estimates are based on logistic regression with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.

## 225 5. Mass Surveys, Main Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)

226 Subjects failing the manipulation check have not been “treated” insofar as they may not have adequately understood the critical  
 227 piece of the prompt: the source of the additional revenues.\* The manipulation check came many questions after the intervention  
 228 and prompted respondents to recall the source of the new government revenue. Enumerators were instructed not to read any  
 229 answer choices or give any assistance to respondents as they answered this question. Only an unassisted answer matching  
 230 exactly the experimental source was coded as correct. To learn if non-compliers drive the intent-to-treat estimates towards a  
 231 null result, we estimated the treatment effects for the subgroup of respondents who passed the manipulation check. Passage  
 232 rates were fairly high despite the relatively difficult check, averaging 70 percent across conditions and countries. However,  
 233 subjects failed the manipulation check significantly more often for the tax condition, suggesting some selection effects across  
 234 experimental conditions.

235 This restricted sample does pass balance tests as illustrated in *SI Appendix, Section 4*. We note that, if the most attentive  
 236 subjects were those passing the manipulation check, the subgroup analysis should bias the findings in favor of the original  
 237 taxation-causes-accountability argument: those most attuned to taxes should be the subjects most willing to take action  
 238 to monitor the use of tax money. The tax treatment among the manipulation check group thus focuses on a smaller, more  
 239 exclusive group of subjects especially attentive to the mention of taxes. Yet these results are null with narrow confidence  
 240 intervals suggesting precise estimation.

241 We explore the effects of treatments in mass survey for the sample of respondents who passed the manipulation check with  
 242 missing values not imputed. As demonstrated below, we do not find substantial differences from imputing these values.

**Table S6. Action Index, Main Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda	Ghana	Uganda	Ghana	Uganda	Ghana
	Oil Treat-Aid Ctr		Tax Treat-Aid Ctr		Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.009	−0.047*	−0.013	−0.036	−0.004	0.011
	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.029)
Action Index (PCA)	−0.005	−0.095*	−0.016	−0.075	−0.011	0.020
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.053)
Create Agency	−0.024	−0.119**	0.071	−0.045	0.095	0.074
	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.061)	(0.054)
Willing to Send SMS	0.015	0.019	0.027	−0.047	0.013	−0.067
	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Sent SMS	−0.071	0.037	0.001	0.019	0.072	−0.018
	(0.061)	(0.054)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.064)	(0.057)
Donated (Binary)	0.072	−0.001	0.006	−0.102*	−0.065	−0.101*
	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.052)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.017	−0.120**	0.071	−0.037	0.088	0.083
	(0.058)	(0.052)	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.062)	(0.054)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.048	−0.057	−0.050	−0.062	−0.002	−0.005
	(0.058)	(0.049)	(0.060)	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.051)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.024	−0.055	−0.028	−0.008	−0.051	0.047
	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.053)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.070	−0.081	−0.134**	−0.034	−0.064	0.047
	(0.058)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.061)	(0.053)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.049	−0.048	−0.090	−0.018	−0.138**	0.031
	(0.057)	(0.051)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.060)	(0.053)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Notes: Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

\*Estimating the complier average causal effect (CACE) is not advised because there is no control condition; rather, we compare multiple treatment conditions, so double-sided non-compliance is not symmetric.

**Table S7. Action Index, NGO Pooled Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.060** (0.024)	−0.004 (0.022)
Action Index (PCA)	0.115** (0.046)	0.012 (0.042)
Create Agency	0.066 (0.047)	0.004 (0.042)
Willing to Send SMS	0.005 (0.045)	−0.029 (0.041)
Sent SMS	−0.034 (0.049)	−0.040 (0.044)
Donated (Binary)	0.126*** (0.043)	−0.060 (0.041)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.076 (0.047)	0.007 (0.042)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.035 (0.047)	0.016 (0.040)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.105** (0.045)	0.031 (0.042)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.088* (0.046)	−0.010 (0.042)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.070 (0.046)	0.050 (0.041)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S8. Benefit Index, Main Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.015 (0.036)	−0.030 (0.032)	0.009 (0.037)	−0.042 (0.033)	0.024 (0.038)	−0.012 (0.033)
Benefit Index (PCA)	−0.025 (0.057)	−0.057 (0.050)	0.037 (0.059)	−0.031 (0.052)	0.062 (0.060)	0.026 (0.052)
Funds Benefit Family	0.008 (0.057)	−0.104** (0.050)	0.050 (0.059)	−0.042 (0.053)	0.042 (0.060)	0.062 (0.053)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.0005 (0.055)	−0.058 (0.049)	0.030 (0.057)	−0.009 (0.051)	0.031 (0.058)	0.049 (0.051)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.103* (0.057)	0.059 (0.051)	−0.020 (0.059)	−0.008 (0.053)	0.083 (0.060)	−0.068 (0.053)
Funds Split Equally	0.034 (0.058)	−0.020 (0.052)	0.007 (0.060)	−0.112** (0.054)	−0.027 (0.061)	−0.092* (0.054)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S9. Benefit Index, NGO Pooled Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda NGO Treat-Non-NGO Ctr	Ghana NGO Ctr
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.043 (0.029)	0.040 (0.026)
Benefit Index (PCA)	0.055 (0.046)	0.099** (0.040)
Funds Benefit Family	0.057 (0.046)	0.087** (0.041)
Funds Benefit Community	0.027 (0.045)	0.036 (0.040)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.034 (0.046)	0.125*** (0.041)
Funds Split Equally	0.055 (0.047)	-0.060 (0.042)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S10. Misappropriation Index, Main Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr (1)	Ghana (2)	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr (3)	Ghana (4)	Uganda Tax Treat-Oil Ctr (5)	Ghana (6)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.020 (0.034)	0.002 (0.029)	0.040 (0.035)	0.038 (0.030)	0.061* (0.036)	0.036 (0.030)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	0.008 (0.060)	0.037 (0.053)	0.058 (0.062)	0.046 (0.055)	0.050 (0.063)	0.010 (0.055)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.016 (0.060)	0.064 (0.053)	0.085 (0.062)	0.140** (0.055)	0.069 (0.063)	0.077 (0.055)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.006 (0.056)	−0.020 (0.048)	0.015 (0.057)	−0.058 (0.051)	0.021 (0.059)	−0.038 (0.051)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.063 (0.058)	−0.028 (0.050)	0.018 (0.060)	0.067 (0.051)	0.081 (0.061)	0.094* (0.052)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S11. Misappropriation Index, NGO Pooled Results (Unimputed, Passed Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda NGO Treat- (1)	Ghana Non-NGO Ctr (2)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.091*** (0.027)	−0.007 (0.023)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	−0.099** (0.048)	−0.065 (0.043)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.142*** (0.048)	−0.040 (0.043)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.043 (0.045)	−0.028 (0.040)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.084* (0.047)	0.058 (0.040)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.



243 **6. Mass Surveys, Main Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

244 We now investigate the effects of treatments in mass survey for the full sample without imputing missing values. We again do  
 245 not find substantial differences between these results and from imputing the missing values.

**Table S12. Action Index, Main Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.003 (0.025)	−0.028 (0.024)	0.002 (0.025)	−0.012 (0.024)	0.005 (0.025)	0.016 (0.024)
Action Index (PCA)	−0.017 (0.048)	−0.048 (0.044)	−0.015 (0.048)	−0.022 (0.044)	0.002 (0.048)	0.026 (0.044)
Create Agency	−0.019 (0.048)	−0.077* (0.045)	0.051 (0.048)	−0.018 (0.045)	0.070 (0.048)	0.059 (0.045)
Willing to Send SMS	0.013 (0.047)	0.024 (0.044)	−0.023 (0.046)	−0.009 (0.044)	−0.037 (0.047)	−0.033 (0.044)
Sent SMS	−0.090* (0.050)	0.034 (0.047)	−0.002 (0.050)	0.009 (0.047)	0.087* (0.050)	−0.025 (0.047)
Donated (Binary)	0.048 (0.045)	−0.026 (0.043)	0.025 (0.044)	−0.045 (0.043)	−0.023 (0.045)	−0.019 (0.043)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.013 (0.048)	−0.097** (0.045)	0.045 (0.048)	−0.027 (0.045)	0.058 (0.048)	0.070 (0.045)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.021 (0.048)	0.001 (0.041)	−0.057 (0.047)	−0.028 (0.041)	−0.036 (0.047)	−0.028 (0.041)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.030 (0.046)	−0.036 (0.045)	0.024 (0.046)	−0.004 (0.045)	−0.006 (0.046)	0.032 (0.045)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.056 (0.047)	−0.060 (0.044)	−0.049 (0.047)	−0.012 (0.044)	0.007 (0.047)	0.048 (0.044)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.065 (0.047)	−0.014 (0.044)	−0.015 (0.047)	0.019 (0.044)	−0.080* (0.047)	0.033 (0.044)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S13. Action Index, NGO Pooled Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

	Uganda NGO Treat, Non-NGO Ctr	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.038* (0.021)	0.010 (0.020)
Action Index (PCA)	0.069* (0.039)	0.029 (0.035)
Create Agency	0.051 (0.039)	0.005 (0.037)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.021 (0.038)	0.004 (0.035)
Sent SMS	−0.036 (0.041)	−0.013 (0.038)
Donated (Binary)	0.080** (0.036)	−0.073** (0.035)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.051 (0.039)	0.006 (0.036)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.031 (0.039)	0.033 (0.034)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.080** (0.038)	0.045 (0.036)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.079** (0.038)	0.025 (0.036)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.020 (0.038)	0.052 (0.036)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S14. Benefit Index, Main Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.004 (0.030)	-0.007 (0.027)	0.016 (0.030)	-0.002 (0.027)	0.011 (0.030)	0.005 (0.027)
Benefit Index (PCA)	-0.018 (0.048)	-0.036 (0.043)	0.036 (0.047)	0.022 (0.043)	0.055 (0.047)	0.058 (0.043)
Funds Benefit Family	0.016 (0.047)	-0.076* (0.043)	0.071 (0.047)	-0.006 (0.043)	0.055 (0.046)	0.070 (0.044)
Funds Benefit Community	0.012 (0.046)	-0.043 (0.042)	0.033 (0.046)	0.022 (0.042)	0.021 (0.046)	0.065 (0.042)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	-0.100** (0.048)	0.059 (0.044)	-0.034 (0.047)	0.038 (0.044)	0.066 (0.047)	-0.020 (0.044)
Funds Split Equally	0.061 (0.048)	0.028 (0.045)	0.003 (0.047)	-0.053 (0.045)	-0.058 (0.047)	-0.082* (0.045)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S15. Benefit Index, NGO Pooled Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

	Uganda NGO Treat, Non-NGO Ctr	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.026 (0.024)	0.047** (0.022)
Benefit Index (PCA)	0.034 (0.039)	0.097*** (0.035)
Funds Benefit Family	0.046 (0.038)	0.084** (0.035)
Funds Benefit Community	0.019 (0.038)	0.048 (0.034)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.005 (0.039)	0.109*** (0.036)
Funds Split Equally	0.041 (0.039)	−0.039 (0.037)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S16. Misappropriation Index, Main Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.042 (0.028)	−0.018 (0.025)	0.012 (0.028)	0.015 (0.025)	0.054* (0.028)	0.032 (0.025)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	−0.022 (0.049)	0.005 (0.047)	0.022 (0.049)	0.016 (0.047)	0.044 (0.049)	0.011 (0.047)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.012 (0.050)	0.039 (0.046)	0.046 (0.050)	0.086* (0.046)	0.058 (0.050)	0.047 (0.046)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.018 (0.045)	−0.044 (0.042)	−0.021 (0.045)	−0.057 (0.042)	−0.003 (0.045)	−0.013 (0.043)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.076 (0.048)	−0.020 (0.043)	0.024 (0.048)	0.039 (0.043)	0.101** (0.048)	0.059 (0.043)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S17. Misappropriation Index, NGO Pooled Results (Unimputed, Full Sample)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.079*** (0.023)	−0.019 (0.020)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	−0.098** (0.040)	−0.045 (0.038)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.128*** (0.040)	−0.014 (0.037)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.040 (0.037)	−0.040 (0.035)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.064 (0.039)	0.011 (0.035)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table S18. Action Index, Main Results (MI, Manipulation Check)

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.007 (0.030)	−0.048* (0.027)	−0.013 (0.031)	−0.037 (0.028)	−0.006 (0.032)	0.011 (0.028)
Action Index (PCA)	−0.011 (0.057)	−0.103** (0.050)	−0.017 (0.059)	−0.068 (0.053)	−0.005 (0.060)	0.035 (0.053)
Create Agency	−0.026 (0.058)	−0.118** (0.052)	0.073 (0.060)	−0.049 (0.054)	0.099 (0.061)	0.068 (0.054)
Willing to Send SMS	0.018 (0.056)	0.019 (0.050)	0.028 (0.058)	−0.040 (0.052)	0.011 (0.058)	−0.059 (0.053)
Sent SMS	−0.071 (0.061)	0.037 (0.054)	0.001 (0.063)	0.019 (0.056)	0.072 (0.064)	−0.018 (0.057)
Donated (Binary)	0.072 (0.054)	−0.001 (0.050)	0.006 (0.055)	−0.102* (0.052)	−0.065 (0.056)	−0.101* (0.052)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.011 (0.058)	−0.123** (0.052)	0.074 (0.060)	−0.038 (0.054)	0.085 (0.061)	0.085 (0.054)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.048 (0.058)	−0.057 (0.049)	−0.050 (0.060)	−0.062 (0.051)	−0.002 (0.061)	−0.005 (0.051)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.020 (0.056)	−0.053 (0.051)	−0.028 (0.057)	−0.008 (0.053)	−0.048 (0.059)	0.045 (0.053)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.073 (0.058)	−0.085* (0.051)	−0.140** (0.059)	−0.033 (0.053)	−0.067 (0.060)	0.052 (0.053)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.053 (0.057)	−0.049 (0.051)	−0.090 (0.059)	−0.017 (0.053)	−0.143** (0.060)	0.032 (0.053)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Notes: Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects over five imputed datasets for only respondents who passed the manipulation check. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S19. Action Index, NGO Pooled Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.060** (0.024)	−0.004 (0.022)
Action Index (PCA)	0.110** (0.046)	0.010 (0.041)
Create Agency	0.067 (0.047)	−0.001 (0.042)
Willing to Send SMS	0.006 (0.045)	−0.032 (0.041)
Sent SMS	−0.034 (0.049)	−0.040 (0.044)
Donated (Binary)	0.126*** (0.043)	−0.060 (0.041)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.077 (0.047)	0.010 (0.042)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.035 (0.047)	0.016 (0.040)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.102** (0.045)	0.032 (0.042)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.089* (0.046)	−0.004 (0.041)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.071 (0.046)	0.048 (0.041)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.



**Table S20. Benefit Index, Main Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.023 (0.037)	−0.023 (0.032)	0.011 (0.037)	−0.039 (0.033)	0.035 (0.039)	−0.016 (0.034)
Benefit Index (PCA)	−0.031 (0.057)	−0.046 (0.048)	0.027 (0.057)	−0.024 (0.051)	0.058 (0.059)	0.022 (0.051)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.001 (0.057)	−0.091* (0.051)	0.047 (0.059)	−0.036 (0.054)	0.049 (0.060)	0.055 (0.053)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.003 (0.057)	−0.046 (0.050)	0.025 (0.058)	0.001 (0.051)	0.029 (0.059)	0.047 (0.051)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.117** (0.059)	0.055 (0.051)	−0.031 (0.059)	−0.008 (0.053)	0.087 (0.062)	−0.063 (0.053)
Funds Split Equally	0.029 (0.061)	−0.011 (0.052)	0.004 (0.060)	−0.113** (0.055)	−0.025 (0.063)	−0.102* (0.055)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects over five imputed datasets for only respondents who passed the manipulation check. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S21. Benefit Index, NGO Pooled Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.044 (0.029)	0.044* (0.026)
Benefit Index (PCA)	0.059 (0.045)	0.088** (0.039)
Funds Benefit Family	0.061 (0.047)	0.079* (0.041)
Funds Benefit Community	0.024 (0.045)	0.033 (0.040)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.039 (0.046)	0.123*** (0.042)
Funds Split Equally	0.051 (0.048)	-0.060 (0.044)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S22. Misappropriation Index, Main Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Oil Ctr	Ghana Treat-Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.016 (0.036)	0.012 (0.029)	0.037 (0.037)	0.051* (0.030)	0.053 (0.037)	0.040 (0.030)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	0.021 (0.059)	0.033 (0.051)	0.054 (0.061)	0.039 (0.055)	0.034 (0.062)	0.006 (0.054)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.014 (0.064)	0.067 (0.054)	0.079 (0.068)	0.147*** (0.055)	0.065 (0.069)	0.080 (0.055)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.004 (0.056)	−0.019 (0.048)	0.012 (0.058)	−0.057 (0.051)	0.008 (0.059)	−0.038 (0.052)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.065 (0.060)	−0.014 (0.050)	0.020 (0.060)	0.064 (0.052)	0.086 (0.061)	0.078 (0.051)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects over five imputed datasets for only respondents who passed the manipulation check. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S23. Misappropriation Index, NGO Pooled Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.095*** (0.027)	−0.005 (0.023)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	−0.112** (0.046)	−0.052 (0.041)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.142*** (0.047)	−0.039 (0.042)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.052 (0.045)	−0.025 (0.039)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.091* (0.048)	0.048 (0.040)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

247 **8. Mass Surveys, Main Results (Imputed, Full Sample)**

248 We investigate the treatment effects for the full sample after imputing the missing values using the **Amelia** package in **R** for five  
 249 imputed datasets. We then construct the indexes by averaging over the imputed values of the individual measures.

**Table S24. Action Index, Main Results (MI, Full Sample)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.003 (0.025)	−0.029 (0.024)	0.002 (0.025)	−0.013 (0.024)	0.004 (0.025)	0.016 (0.024)
Action Index (PCA)	−0.002 (0.047)	−0.058 (0.043)	−0.001 (0.047)	−0.028 (0.043)	0.001 (0.047)	0.029 (0.043)
Create Agency	−0.017 (0.048)	−0.075* (0.045)	0.058 (0.048)	−0.019 (0.045)	0.075 (0.048)	0.056 (0.045)
Willing to Send SMS	0.018 (0.047)	0.022 (0.044)	−0.023 (0.046)	−0.004 (0.044)	−0.041 (0.046)	−0.025 (0.044)
Sent SMS	−0.090* (0.050)	0.034 (0.047)	−0.002 (0.050)	0.009 (0.047)	0.087* (0.050)	−0.025 (0.047)
Donated (Binary)	0.048 (0.045)	−0.026 (0.043)	0.025 (0.044)	−0.045 (0.043)	−0.023 (0.045)	−0.019 (0.043)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.008 (0.048)	−0.098** (0.045)	0.048 (0.048)	−0.031 (0.045)	0.056 (0.048)	0.068 (0.045)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.021 (0.048)	0.001 (0.041)	−0.057 (0.047)	−0.028 (0.041)	−0.036 (0.047)	−0.028 (0.041)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.030 (0.046)	−0.036 (0.044)	0.026 (0.046)	−0.005 (0.044)	−0.004 (0.046)	0.030 (0.045)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.058 (0.048)	−0.063 (0.044)	−0.053 (0.047)	−0.017 (0.044)	0.005 (0.047)	0.046 (0.044)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.069 (0.047)	−0.016 (0.044)	−0.014 (0.047)	0.018 (0.044)	−0.083* (0.047)	0.034 (0.045)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects over five imputed datasets for the full sample. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S25. Action Index, NGO Pooled Results (MI, Full Sample)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.037* (0.020)	0.009 (0.020)
Action Index (PCA)	0.069* (0.038)	0.028 (0.035)
Create Agency	0.051 (0.039)	0.001 (0.036)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.022 (0.038)	0.001 (0.036)
Sent SMS	−0.036 (0.041)	−0.013 (0.038)
Donated (Binary)	0.080** (0.036)	−0.073** (0.035)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.050 (0.039)	0.010 (0.036)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.031 (0.039)	0.033 (0.034)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.078** (0.038)	0.045 (0.036)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.080** (0.038)	0.032 (0.036)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.023 (0.038)	0.051 (0.036)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S26. Benefit Index, Main Results (MI, Full Sample)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.007 (0.030)	−0.004 (0.028)	0.017 (0.030)	0.004 (0.028)	0.024 (0.030)	0.008 (0.028)
Benefit Index (PCA)	−0.011 (0.046)	−0.027 (0.042)	0.039 (0.046)	0.025 (0.042)	0.051 (0.046)	0.052 (0.042)
Funds Benefit Family	0.009 (0.046)	−0.062 (0.043)	0.073 (0.047)	−0.001 (0.044)	0.063 (0.046)	0.061 (0.044)
Funds Benefit Community	0.013 (0.049)	−0.037 (0.043)	0.030 (0.047)	0.030 (0.043)	0.017 (0.047)	0.067 (0.043)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.110** (0.048)	0.053 (0.045)	−0.037 (0.048)	0.041 (0.044)	0.073 (0.048)	−0.011 (0.045)
Funds Split Equally	0.062 (0.050)	0.031 (0.046)	0.002 (0.049)	−0.054 (0.046)	−0.059 (0.049)	−0.086* (0.046)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects over five imputed datasets for the full sample. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S27. Benefit Index, NGO Pooled Index (MI, Full Sample)**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.023 (0.024)	0.046** (0.022)
Benefit Index (PCA)	0.033 (0.038)	0.090*** (0.034)
Funds Benefit Family	0.051 (0.039)	0.080** (0.035)
Funds Benefit Community	0.010 (0.039)	0.047 (0.034)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.003 (0.038)	0.101*** (0.038)
Funds Split Equally	0.034 (0.040)	−0.045 (0.037)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.



**Table S28. Misappropriation Index, Main Effects (MI, Full Sample)**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.036 (0.028)	−0.008 (0.025)	0.014 (0.029)	0.024 (0.026)	0.050* (0.028)	0.032 (0.025)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	−0.016 (0.048)	−0.003 (0.046)	0.009 (0.049)	0.012 (0.046)	0.025 (0.050)	0.015 (0.045)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.023 (0.052)	0.040 (0.050)	0.039 (0.053)	0.088* (0.047)	0.062 (0.054)	0.048 (0.047)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.009 (0.045)	−0.047 (0.043)	−0.021 (0.045)	−0.054 (0.043)	−0.012 (0.045)	−0.007 (0.043)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.076 (0.049)	−0.016 (0.044)	0.025 (0.048)	0.039 (0.045)	0.101** (0.047)	0.055 (0.044)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects over five imputed datasets for the full sample. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S29. Misappropriation Index, Main Effects (MI, Full Sample)**

	Uganda NGO Treat, Non-NGO Ctr (1)	Ghana (2)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.079*** (0.023)	−0.020 (0.020)
Misappropriation Index (PCA)	−0.103*** (0.039)	−0.032 (0.036)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.118*** (0.041)	−0.014 (0.037)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.045 (0.037)	−0.037 (0.035)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.074* (0.039)	−0.009 (0.035)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

## 9. Mass Surveys, Heterogeneous Effects

The overall null effects across the government-directed revenue sources may mask different causal effects for different subgroups. The more nuanced version of the taxation and accountability arguments claims that only under certain conditions will taxes induce greater accountability. Unfortunately, many different conditions are identified in different studies; however, we examine some of the most prominent ones. Do our results vary by subgroups that might experience the revenues in distinct ways? We find very little evidence for this.<sup>†</sup>

Briefly, we identify two important groups here and present the full set of results in the tables below. Previous work suggests that wealthy, informed, income-tax-paying citizens will prove most susceptible to the taxation effect (1, 2). To capture these types of respondents, we created an indicator variable for those who reported paying both direct and indirect taxes and were urban (and thus more educated and wealthy, on average, than rural respondents).<sup>‡</sup>

We also examined members of the opposition party in both countries since they may be most likely to feel that tax-based revenues will not be used to benefit them, and hence should seek greater transparency and stricter oversight of tax-based expenditures. We subset respondents by whether or not they self-identified as supporters of the governing party, which may proxy for expectations that the government will be more likely to spend revenues according to their preferences. In neither case do we see significantly different treatment effects for either high- or low-type respondents or for government- or opposition-party supporters. See Section I in the appendix for these results.

Further, we assessed respondents from oil regions separately from those not, those who are not a coethnic with the president, those who have low levels of trust in the government (as proxied by trust in the president), those who feel the government is very corrupt, and those who evince low levels of approval for central government's handling of public goods. Previous research suggests that those with low levels of trust in government may not see taxation as different than other sources (3), while other research suggests that an individual's beliefs about the level of public-goods provision should moderate the relationship (4). We find no support for these moderating factors, as shown in the appendix Section I.

In terms of the NGO comparisons to government-directed funds, the subgroup effects in Section I of the appendix do not shed much light. These factors do not seem to be driving our significant results in Uganda. Beliefs and actions about NGO funds being better than government ones persist across all of the tested subgroups.

The tables below present analysis of heterogeneous effects of various subgroups, including respondents who reside in oil regions, were government supporters, are female, had experience paying taxes, did not approve of recent central government initiatives, reported low levels of trust in the government, were not a coethnic with the sitting president, reported high levels of corruption by politicians, reported high levels of poverty in their district, were members of the ruling party and reported high levels of poverty, and those who expressed high levels of trust in NGOs. We estimate the effects for the imputed dataset and for only respondents who passed the manipulation check. Overall, we fail to find consistent and significant heterogeneous effects for any subgroup.

For each subgroup, we rely on the following questions from the mass surveys:

- **Oil Region:** Respondents were placed in a “high oil region” if the enumerator reported that s/he conducted the interview in the Western region for Ghana or the districts of Masindi, Hoima, or Buliisa in Uganda.
- **Government Supporter:** A respondent was coded as a government supporter if s/he reported feeling close to the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Ghana or the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda.
- **High Type:** If the subject reported paying income or sales tax following the question, “There are many different kinds of taxes in [Ghana/Uganda]. What kinds of taxes do you pay?”, s/he was classified as a “High Type”.
- **Low Approval:** Respondents were asked a series of questions evaluating the central government's job performance. We first provided the prompt, “What about the central government? How well or badly would you say it is doing the following things IN THE COUNTRY?:” followed by a number of public services and initiatives to evaluate: 1) “Improving basic health services”; 2) “Addressing educational needs”; 3) “Providing water and sanitation service”; 4) “Fighting corruption in government”; 5) “Maintaining roads and bridges”; 6) “Providing a reliable supply of electricity”. Responses were provided on a five-point scale from “Very Poor” to “Excellent”. We first standardized all responses and then took the average of the sum of all non-missing values. Respondents were classified as “Low Approval” if their responses fell within the bottom quartile.
- **Low Trust:** We also asked a series of questions about how much respondents trusted the President (“How much do you trust the following people? ... The President.”) on a four-point scale from “Not at all” to “A Lot”. We classified s/he as having low trust in the President if they answered “Not at all” or “Just a little”.
- **Non-Coethnic:** Subjects were coded as a non-coethnic with the President if they answered the negative to the following question, “I am going to read you a list of people. After each, I would like you to say if that person is from the same ethnic group as you. ... The President.”

<sup>†</sup> Out of the eleven different subgroups investigated for each comparison group, or over 264 different tests in both countries, we find fourteen tests that are significant at the .05 or .01 levels as shown in appendix section I.

<sup>‡</sup> Construction of these variables across countries differs slightly due to available data. In Ghana, where we collected data on taxpaying experience, high-types are coded as those subjects who reported paying a sales or income tax. Because we did not measure taxpaying experience in Uganda, a high-type respondent is one who is in the top quartile of wealth as measured by the standard deprivation battery.

- **High Corruption:** We asked respondents how they felt about various indicators of corruption. Specifically, we asked, “I’m going to read you a list of things that sometimes happen in politics. After each, I’d like you to tell me how often you think each of them happen: . . . 1) Elected leaders use development funds to benefit themselves and their families.; 2) Elected leaders use development funds to benefit their political friends and allies.; and, 3) Elected leaders use development funds to develop the country.” Respondents evaluating the individual questions on a five-point scale from “Never” to “Always”. We first standardized all responses and then took the average of the sum of all non-missing values. Respondents were classified as “High Corruption” if their responses fell within the top quartile.
- **High Poverty:** We also asked subjects about their experiences with poverty. Specifically, we asked, “Over the past six months, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family ever gone without the following things?:” 1) Enough food to eat; 2) Enough clean water for home use; 3) Medicines or medicinal treatment; 4) Enough fuel to cook your food; and 5) A cash income. Respondents expressed their experiences on a five-point scale from “Never” to “Always”. We first standardized all responses and then took the average of the sum of all non-missing values. Respondents were classified as “High Poverty” if their responses fell within the top quartile.
- **High Poverty-Government Supporter:** We also looked at those respondents who reported they experience high levels of poverty and were government supporters.
- **High Trust in NGOs:** We looked at the question, “How much do you trust each of the following organizations?” We classified respondents as having high levels of trust in NGOs by those who said “Somewhat” or “A lot” to the question, “Non-governmental organizations (NGOs).”

**Table S30. Uganda: Action Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low App	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.051 (0.086)	−0.016 (0.065)	−0.089 (0.060)	0.014 (0.073)	−0.010 (0.065)	0.040 (0.069)	0.080 (0.101)	−0.100 (0.077)
Create Agency	0.204 (0.164)	0.037 (0.125)	−0.009 (0.117)	0.075 (0.143)	0.169 (0.126)	−0.033 (0.132)	−0.064 (0.193)	−0.314** (0.147)
Willing to Send SMS	0.088 (0.158)	−0.036 (0.121)	−0.125 (0.112)	0.195 (0.136)	−0.192 (0.121)	−0.011 (0.129)	−0.319* (0.185)	−0.234 (0.143)
Sent SMS	−0.176 (0.174)	0.033 (0.132)	0.045 (0.123)	0.212 (0.148)	−0.056 (0.129)	−0.065 (0.141)	0.251 (0.207)	−0.095 (0.154)
Donated (Binary)	0.152 (0.153)	−0.042 (0.116)	−0.194* (0.108)	0.154 (0.131)	−0.171 (0.116)	0.035 (0.123)	0.155 (0.180)	−0.251* (0.136)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.155 (0.165)	−0.041 (0.126)	0.031 (0.118)	0.080 (0.142)	0.161 (0.127)	0.006 (0.133)	−0.005 (0.194)	−0.307** (0.148)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.026 (0.165)	−0.066 (0.125)	−0.045 (0.116)	0.014 (0.141)	−0.116 (0.128)	0.199 (0.132)	0.046 (0.194)	−0.179 (0.153)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.246 (0.160)	−0.057 (0.121)	−0.132 (0.113)	−0.128 (0.137)	0.078 (0.119)	0.244* (0.127)	0.020 (0.185)	0.160 (0.142)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.096 (0.163)	0.017 (0.125)	−0.073 (0.116)	−0.269* (0.141)	0.015 (0.126)	0.001 (0.131)	0.268 (0.191)	0.086 (0.149)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.165 (0.163)	0.004 (0.123)	−0.294** (0.114)	−0.189 (0.139)	0.032 (0.122)	0.002 (0.131)	0.365* (0.190)	0.243* (0.144)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S31. Uganda: Action Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control II, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	NGO Trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.032 (0.073)	0.058 (0.085)	−0.045 (0.067)
Create Agency	−0.142 (0.139)	−0.101 (0.163)	0.004 (0.129)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.104 (0.135)	0.040 (0.160)	−0.133 (0.125)
Sent SMS	−0.293** (0.147)	−0.173 (0.172)	0.143 (0.142)
Donated (Binary)	−0.035 (0.129)	−0.035 (0.151)	−0.092 (0.119)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.078 (0.140)	−0.085 (0.165)	−0.012 (0.130)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.125 (0.139)	0.225 (0.163)	−0.112 (0.129)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.109 (0.134)	0.321** (0.156)	−0.088 (0.126)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.135 (0.137)	−0.016 (0.161)	−0.096 (0.126)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.232* (0.137)	0.303* (0.160)	−0.021 (0.128)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

Table S32. Ghana: Action Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.080 (0.119)	−0.020 (0.058)	0.003 (0.054)	0.083 (0.070)	0.032 (0.060)	−0.034 (0.055)	−0.127 (0.165)	−0.027 (0.068)
Create Agency	−0.108 (0.227)	0.081 (0.110)	−0.019 (0.105)	0.143 (0.133)	−0.029 (0.114)	−0.044 (0.104)	−0.077 (0.316)	0.112 (0.128)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.085 (0.217)	0.020 (0.107)	0.058 (0.101)	0.083 (0.129)	0.026 (0.109)	−0.138 (0.102)	0.030 (0.304)	−0.050 (0.121)
Sent SMS	−0.055 (0.261)	0.116 (0.115)	−0.085 (0.110)	−0.031 (0.140)	−0.179 (0.118)	−0.164 (0.110)	−0.088 (0.331)	−0.080 (0.131)
Donated (Binary)	0.080 (0.218)	0.045 (0.107)	−0.130 (0.101)	0.204 (0.129)	0.156 (0.110)	−0.015 (0.101)	−0.076 (0.305)	0.021 (0.121)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.110 (0.227)	0.031 (0.110)	−0.053 (0.105)	0.112 (0.134)	−0.026 (0.113)	−0.045 (0.104)	−0.081 (0.317)	0.036 (0.127)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.069 (0.213)	−0.054 (0.104)	−0.063 (0.098)	0.116 (0.126)	0.085 (0.107)	0.025 (0.098)	−0.098 (0.297)	−0.155 (0.121)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.062 (0.222)	−0.160 (0.108)	0.156 (0.102)	0.037 (0.132)	0.061 (0.113)	−0.050 (0.103)	−0.263 (0.309)	−0.107 (0.129)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.064 (0.221)	−0.098 (0.108)	0.007 (0.102)	0.070 (0.132)	0.051 (0.112)	0.032 (0.102)	−0.214 (0.308)	−0.102 (0.124)
Pr(Contact MP)	−0.376* (0.222)	−0.159 (0.108)	0.146 (0.102)	0.015 (0.133)	0.141 (0.114)	0.086 (0.103)	−0.306 (0.309)	0.085 (0.123)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Notes: Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S33. Ghana: Action Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control II, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.041 (0.068)	−0.132 (0.120)	−0.065 (0.065)
Create Agency	−0.052 (0.129)	−0.189 (0.228)	0.124 (0.122)
Willing to Send SMS	0.104 (0.125)	0.179 (0.221)	−0.146 (0.123)
Sent SMS	−0.021 (0.135)	0.218 (0.239)	0.030 (0.134)
Donated (Binary)	−0.154 (0.125)	0.108 (0.221)	−0.217* (0.121)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.062 (0.129)	−0.178 (0.228)	0.154 (0.122)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.025 (0.122)	−0.006 (0.215)	−0.059 (0.116)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.145 (0.128)	−0.609*** (0.224)	−0.135 (0.122)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.008 (0.127)	−0.393* (0.224)	−0.143 (0.121)
Pr(Contact MP)	−0.073 (0.127)	−0.320 (0.224)	−0.180 (0.122)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).



**Table S34. Uganda: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.045 (0.091)	−0.008 (0.067)	−0.047 (0.062)	0.030 (0.074)	−0.067 (0.069)	−0.001 (0.072)	0.013 (0.111)	−0.020 (0.083)
Create Agency	0.154 (0.174)	0.014 (0.128)	−0.086 (0.121)	0.070 (0.142)	0.109 (0.134)	−0.024 (0.137)	−0.179 (0.213)	−0.209 (0.155)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.162 (0.167)	−0.070 (0.124)	−0.035 (0.115)	0.037 (0.136)	0.014 (0.125)	−0.078 (0.133)	−0.241 (0.205)	−0.101 (0.150)
Sent SMS	−0.272 (0.184)	0.089 (0.135)	−0.051 (0.127)	0.195 (0.149)	−0.059 (0.135)	−0.154 (0.146)	0.055 (0.228)	−0.138 (0.163)
Donated (Binary)	0.209 (0.161)	0.177 (0.119)	−0.079 (0.112)	−0.172 (0.131)	−0.067 (0.120)	−0.110 (0.127)	0.055 (0.198)	−0.088 (0.147)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.169 (0.175)	0.029 (0.129)	−0.049 (0.122)	0.037 (0.144)	0.100 (0.136)	−0.014 (0.138)	−0.128 (0.214)	−0.194 (0.156)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.134 (0.174)	−0.103 (0.128)	0.018 (0.120)	−0.086 (0.142)	−0.058 (0.132)	0.120 (0.137)	0.165 (0.213)	−0.210 (0.161)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.109 (0.167)	−0.157 (0.125)	−0.032 (0.117)	0.146 (0.136)	−0.286** (0.129)	0.260** (0.132)	0.043 (0.204)	0.246 (0.151)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.133 (0.172)	−0.086 (0.129)	0.067 (0.119)	0.100 (0.141)	−0.212* (0.126)	0.058 (0.136)	0.063 (0.211)	0.279* (0.162)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.168 (0.171)	0.035 (0.126)	−0.173 (0.118)	−0.051 (0.139)	−0.126 (0.129)	−0.061 (0.136)	0.283 (0.209)	0.230 (0.154)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S35. Uganda: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Pov-Gov Supp	NGOs Trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.034 (0.073)	0.068 (0.085)	0.027 (0.069)
Create Agency	0.167 (0.141)	0.128 (0.164)	0.051 (0.134)
Willing to Send SMS	0.045 (0.136)	0.101 (0.158)	−0.081 (0.130)
Sent SMS	−0.165 (0.148)	0.038 (0.173)	0.292** (0.147)
Donated (Binary)	0.017 (0.130)	0.027 (0.152)	−0.077 (0.124)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.219 (0.143)	0.150 (0.166)	0.037 (0.135)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.105 (0.141)	0.104 (0.164)	0.020 (0.134)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.082 (0.136)	−0.009 (0.157)	0.023 (0.129)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.114 (0.140)	−0.088 (0.165)	−0.010 (0.131)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.090 (0.138)	0.125 (0.163)	−0.010 (0.131)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S36. Ghana: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.004 (0.130)	−0.029 (0.060)	−0.059 (0.056)	0.026 (0.074)	0.072 (0.062)	−0.029 (0.057)	0.025 (0.158)	−0.041 (0.071)
Create Agency	0.087 (0.248)	0.008 (0.115)	−0.130 (0.109)	−0.025 (0.141)	0.128 (0.117)	−0.078 (0.108)	−0.179 (0.302)	−0.068 (0.137)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.244 (0.237)	−0.122 (0.111)	0.032 (0.105)	0.100 (0.136)	0.003 (0.114)	−0.127 (0.107)	0.469 (0.290)	0.197 (0.126)
Sent SMS	0.152 (0.286)	0.191 (0.120)	0.019 (0.114)	0.138 (0.147)	−0.113 (0.123)	−0.173 (0.115)	0.055 (0.315)	−0.003 (0.135)
Donated (Binary)	0.268 (0.238)	−0.056 (0.111)	−0.044 (0.105)	−0.151 (0.136)	0.185 (0.114)	0.087 (0.106)	−0.130 (0.291)	0.086 (0.126)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.079 (0.248)	−0.006 (0.115)	−0.151 (0.109)	−0.007 (0.141)	0.103 (0.118)	−0.164 (0.109)	−0.164 (0.303)	−0.153 (0.140)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.316 (0.232)	−0.015 (0.108)	−0.092 (0.102)	0.149 (0.133)	0.077 (0.111)	−0.005 (0.103)	0.222 (0.283)	−0.104 (0.125)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.119 (0.243)	−0.090 (0.113)	−0.092 (0.106)	0.028 (0.140)	0.021 (0.116)	−0.008 (0.107)	−0.060 (0.295)	−0.111 (0.129)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.160 (0.241)	−0.024 (0.112)	−0.074 (0.106)	0.036 (0.139)	0.064 (0.116)	0.136 (0.107)	−0.002 (0.294)	−0.203 (0.130)
Pr(Contact MP)	−0.026 (0.243)	−0.152 (0.112)	−0.0002 (0.106)	−0.037 (0.138)	0.165 (0.116)	0.066 (0.107)	−0.020 (0.295)	−0.007 (0.127)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S37. Ghana: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control II, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Pov-Gov Supp	NGOs Trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.037 (0.071)	0.041 (0.108)	0.006 (0.070)
Create Agency	-0.103 (0.135)	-0.111 (0.206)	0.161 (0.132)
Willing to Send SMS	0.068 (0.132)	-0.134 (0.199)	-0.010 (0.132)
Sent SMS	-0.018 (0.142)	0.134 (0.216)	0.054 (0.145)
Donated (Binary)	0.135 (0.131)	0.166 (0.199)	0.028 (0.130)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	-0.127 (0.135)	-0.144 (0.206)	0.154 (0.132)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.035 (0.127)	0.008 (0.194)	-0.073 (0.125)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.042 (0.133)	0.096 (0.202)	-0.038 (0.131)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.070 (0.133)	0.111 (0.202)	-0.073 (0.131)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.234* (0.133)	0.238 (0.202)	-0.140 (0.132)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S38. Uganda: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.006 (0.091)	0.008 (0.068)	0.042 (0.063)	0.016 (0.075)	−0.057 (0.070)	−0.042 (0.073)	−0.067 (0.111)	0.080 (0.083)
Create Agency	−0.050 (0.175)	−0.024 (0.129)	−0.076 (0.122)	−0.005 (0.144)	−0.060 (0.135)	0.009 (0.139)	−0.116 (0.214)	0.105 (0.159)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.250 (0.168)	−0.035 (0.125)	0.090 (0.117)	−0.158 (0.138)	0.206 (0.127)	−0.066 (0.136)	0.078 (0.207)	0.133 (0.152)
Sent SMS	−0.096 (0.184)	0.056 (0.136)	−0.097 (0.129)	−0.017 (0.151)	−0.003 (0.137)	−0.090 (0.148)	−0.196 (0.229)	−0.043 (0.166)
Donated (Binary)	0.056 (0.162)	0.219* (0.119)	0.115 (0.113)	−0.326** (0.134)	0.104 (0.124)	−0.145 (0.129)	−0.100 (0.199)	0.163 (0.148)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.014 (0.176)	0.070 (0.131)	−0.080 (0.124)	−0.043 (0.146)	−0.061 (0.136)	−0.020 (0.140)	−0.123 (0.215)	0.114 (0.162)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.108 (0.175)	−0.037 (0.129)	0.063 (0.121)	−0.100 (0.144)	0.058 (0.133)	−0.080 (0.139)	0.119 (0.214)	−0.031 (0.160)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.137 (0.170)	−0.100 (0.125)	0.100 (0.118)	0.274* (0.141)	−0.364*** (0.131)	0.016 (0.134)	0.024 (0.205)	0.086 (0.152)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.037 (0.173)	−0.103 (0.129)	0.140 (0.121)	0.368*** (0.142)	−0.227* (0.135)	0.057 (0.139)	−0.205 (0.211)	0.193 (0.158)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.003 (0.173)	0.032 (0.128)	0.121 (0.119)	0.139 (0.142)	−0.158 (0.132)	−0.063 (0.138)	−0.083 (0.210)	−0.013 (0.157)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S39. Uganda: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control II, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	NGOs Trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.066 (0.075)	0.009 (0.088)	0.072 (0.070)
Create Agency	0.309** (0.143)	0.229 (0.168)	0.047 (0.135)
Willing to Send SMS	0.149 (0.139)	0.062 (0.164)	0.052 (0.131)
Sent SMS	0.129 (0.151)	0.211 (0.177)	0.149 (0.149)
Donated (Binary)	0.053 (0.133)	0.062 (0.156)	0.015 (0.125)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.297** (0.145)	0.235 (0.169)	0.049 (0.136)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.020 (0.143)	−0.120 (0.168)	0.132 (0.136)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.190 (0.138)	−0.331** (0.161)	0.111 (0.131)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.021 (0.143)	−0.072 (0.169)	0.086 (0.133)
Pr(Contact MP)	−0.142 (0.142)	−0.178 (0.170)	0.011 (0.134)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S40. Ghana: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.085 (0.132)	−0.010 (0.061)	−0.062 (0.057)	−0.057 (0.073)	0.040 (0.062)	0.006 (0.057)	0.152 (0.168)	−0.014 (0.066)
Create Agency	0.195 (0.253)	−0.073 (0.116)	−0.111 (0.110)	−0.168 (0.138)	0.156 (0.117)	−0.034 (0.108)	−0.101 (0.318)	−0.180 (0.129)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.159 (0.241)	−0.141 (0.113)	−0.026 (0.106)	0.017 (0.134)	−0.023 (0.113)	0.011 (0.107)	0.439 (0.310)	0.247** (0.122)
Sent SMS	0.208 (0.291)	0.075 (0.121)	0.104 (0.115)	0.169 (0.145)	0.066 (0.122)	−0.010 (0.115)	0.143 (0.337)	0.077 (0.132)
Donated (Binary)	0.188 (0.242)	−0.101 (0.112)	0.086 (0.106)	−0.355*** (0.135)	0.029 (0.113)	0.102 (0.106)	−0.054 (0.310)	0.065 (0.123)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.190 (0.253)	−0.037 (0.116)	−0.097 (0.110)	−0.118 (0.139)	0.129 (0.118)	−0.119 (0.109)	−0.083 (0.319)	−0.189 (0.130)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.247 (0.236)	0.039 (0.109)	−0.029 (0.103)	0.032 (0.131)	−0.008 (0.110)	−0.031 (0.103)	0.320 (0.302)	0.050 (0.119)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.057 (0.247)	0.070 (0.114)	−0.249** (0.107)	−0.009 (0.138)	−0.040 (0.116)	0.042 (0.107)	0.203 (0.315)	−0.004 (0.125)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.096 (0.246)	0.074 (0.114)	−0.081 (0.107)	−0.034 (0.137)	0.013 (0.116)	0.104 (0.106)	0.212 (0.314)	−0.101 (0.125)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.349 (0.247)	0.008 (0.113)	−0.146 (0.107)	−0.052 (0.137)	0.024 (0.117)	−0.020 (0.107)	0.287 (0.314)	−0.092 (0.124)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S41. Ghana: Action Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control II, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.079 (0.073)	0.173 (0.124)	0.071 (0.071)
Create Agency	-0.050 (0.137)	0.078 (0.235)	0.038 (0.134)
Willing to Send SMS	-0.036 (0.136)	-0.313 (0.228)	0.135 (0.135)
Sent SMS	0.003 (0.144)	-0.085 (0.247)	0.025 (0.147)
Donated (Binary)	0.289** (0.133)	0.058 (0.228)	0.245* (0.132)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	-0.064 (0.138)	0.035 (0.235)	0.0002 (0.134)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.010 (0.130)	0.014 (0.222)	-0.014 (0.127)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.187 (0.136)	0.705*** (0.232)	0.097 (0.132)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.062 (0.135)	0.504** (0.231)	0.070 (0.132)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.308** (0.136)	0.558** (0.232)	0.040 (0.133)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).



**Table S42. Uganda: Action Index, NGO Treatment-Non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.089 (0.072)	0.024 (0.052)	0.025 (0.049)	-0.042 (0.056)	-0.066 (0.053)	0.072 (0.054)	0.036 (0.085)	-0.050 (0.063)
Create Agency	-0.028 (0.138)	-0.052 (0.100)	0.038 (0.095)	-0.093 (0.108)	-0.098 (0.102)	0.189* (0.104)	-0.060 (0.163)	-0.099 (0.118)
Willing to Send SMS	0.201 (0.132)	0.118 (0.096)	-0.039 (0.090)	-0.130 (0.104)	-0.117 (0.098)	0.135 (0.100)	0.048 (0.156)	-0.034 (0.115)
Sent SMS	0.079 (0.146)	0.133 (0.105)	0.086 (0.100)	0.093 (0.114)	-0.024 (0.105)	-0.181 (0.111)	0.119 (0.174)	-0.109 (0.125)
Donated (Binary)	0.056 (0.128)	-0.145 (0.093)	-0.049 (0.088)	-0.024 (0.101)	-0.032 (0.092)	0.088 (0.097)	0.082 (0.152)	-0.082 (0.112)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	-0.035 (0.139)	-0.040 (0.101)	0.006 (0.095)	-0.102 (0.109)	-0.101 (0.104)	0.209** (0.104)	-0.071 (0.164)	-0.072 (0.120)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.062 (0.138)	-0.003 (0.100)	0.146 (0.094)	-0.085 (0.108)	-0.237** (0.101)	0.216** (0.104)	0.001 (0.163)	-0.003 (0.120)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.173 (0.134)	0.051 (0.096)	-0.057 (0.091)	-0.055 (0.105)	-0.032 (0.096)	0.045 (0.100)	0.347** (0.157)	0.077 (0.118)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.234* (0.137)	0.046 (0.100)	0.025 (0.093)	-0.049 (0.108)	0.019 (0.100)	-0.049 (0.104)	-0.066 (0.161)	-0.016 (0.122)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.057 (0.136)	0.102 (0.098)	0.065 (0.093)	0.062 (0.107)	0.039 (0.099)	-0.008 (0.103)	-0.077 (0.160)	-0.115 (0.119)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S43. Uganda: Action Index, NGO Treatment-Non-NGO Control II, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.032 (0.061)	0.035 (0.070)	0.030 (0.054)
Create Agency	0.082 (0.117)	0.047 (0.135)	0.014 (0.105)
Willing to Send SMS	0.117 (0.113)	0.151 (0.130)	−0.069 (0.101)
Sent SMS	0.062 (0.124)	0.115 (0.142)	0.092 (0.115)
Donated (Binary)	0.135 (0.109)	0.106 (0.125)	−0.052 (0.097)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.072 (0.118)	0.027 (0.136)	−0.025 (0.105)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.055 (0.117)	−0.060 (0.135)	−0.066 (0.105)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	−0.097 (0.113)	−0.005 (0.129)	0.004 (0.100)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.058 (0.117)	0.102 (0.133)	0.303*** (0.103)
Pr(Contact MP)	−0.193* (0.115)	−0.160 (0.132)	0.068 (0.103)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S44. Ghana: Action Index, NGO Treatment-Non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg (1)	Gov Supp (2)	Female (3)	High Type (4)	Low Approval (5)	Low Trust (6)	Noncoeth (7)	Corrupt (8)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.189* (0.102)	−0.010 (0.048)	−0.038 (0.044)	−0.045 (0.058)	−0.007 (0.048)	−0.009 (0.044)	0.064 (0.137)	−0.037 (0.055)
Create Agency	−0.255 (0.194)	0.034 (0.091)	0.103 (0.085)	0.015 (0.109)	−0.030 (0.091)	0.060 (0.085)	0.110 (0.259)	−0.075 (0.106)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.055 (0.185)	−0.020 (0.088)	−0.047 (0.081)	−0.247** (0.106)	−0.015 (0.087)	−0.093 (0.082)	0.191 (0.251)	−0.102 (0.103)
Sent SMS	−0.510** (0.223)	0.094 (0.095)	−0.009 (0.089)	−0.347*** (0.114)	0.040 (0.095)	0.032 (0.089)	0.088 (0.273)	0.066 (0.108)
Donated (Binary)	−0.414** (0.186)	−0.013 (0.088)	−0.045 (0.082)	0.013 (0.106)	0.096 (0.088)	−0.062 (0.082)	0.046 (0.252)	0.112 (0.102)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.267 (0.194)	0.039 (0.091)	0.107 (0.085)	0.036 (0.110)	−0.043 (0.091)	0.025 (0.085)	0.120 (0.260)	−0.147 (0.106)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.289 (0.182)	−0.010 (0.085)	0.130 (0.079)	0.016 (0.103)	−0.001 (0.087)	−0.042 (0.080)	0.157 (0.245)	−0.048 (0.098)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.020 (0.190)	−0.005 (0.089)	−0.201** (0.082)	0.046 (0.108)	−0.078 (0.089)	0.027 (0.083)	−0.091 (0.255)	−0.064 (0.101)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.137 (0.189)	−0.104 (0.089)	−0.221*** (0.082)	0.048 (0.108)	0.007 (0.091)	−0.029 (0.083)	0.125 (0.257)	−0.013 (0.101)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.197 (0.190)	−0.110 (0.089)	−0.157* (0.082)	0.017 (0.108)	−0.032 (0.089)	−0.001 (0.083)	−0.177 (0.255)	−0.066 (0.102)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S45. Ghana: Action Index, NGO Treatment-Non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.063 (0.056)	0.233** (0.096)	0.031 (0.053)
Create Agency	0.041 (0.108)	0.333* (0.181)	-0.008 (0.101)
Willing to Send SMS	0.030 (0.104)	0.111 (0.176)	-0.125 (0.101)
Sent SMS	0.110 (0.112)	0.094 (0.191)	-0.113 (0.110)
Donated (Binary)	0.193* (0.104)	0.647*** (0.176)	0.051 (0.099)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.027 (0.108)	0.308* (0.182)	-0.075 (0.100)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.042 (0.101)	0.367** (0.171)	0.113 (0.095)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	-0.018 (0.106)	0.077 (0.179)	0.123 (0.099)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.135 (0.106)	0.098 (0.178)	0.133 (0.100)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.006 (0.106)	0.059 (0.179)	0.173* (0.100)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S46. Uganda: Benefit Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.012 (0.103)	0.077 (0.077)	−0.075 (0.074)	−0.115 (0.087)	−0.042 (0.076)	0.009 (0.083)	0.052 (0.122)	−0.072 (0.093)
Funds Benefit Family	0.003 (0.161)	0.090 (0.122)	−0.088 (0.116)	−0.127 (0.138)	−0.122 (0.121)	0.009 (0.129)	0.342* (0.201)	−0.089 (0.144)
Funds Benefit Community	0.013 (0.158)	0.044 (0.124)	−0.209* (0.118)	−0.130 (0.137)	−0.031 (0.120)	−0.003 (0.131)	0.039 (0.186)	−0.071 (0.139)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.166 (0.164)	0.097 (0.124)	−0.085 (0.119)	−0.155 (0.140)	−0.052 (0.121)	−0.123 (0.132)	−0.132 (0.190)	−0.125 (0.154)
Funds Split Equally	−0.229 (0.173)	0.078 (0.130)	0.082 (0.120)	−0.046 (0.144)	0.037 (0.128)	0.153 (0.134)	−0.041 (0.199)	−0.003 (0.150)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S47. Uganda: Benefit Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.022 (0.087)	−0.002 (0.102)	−0.001 (0.080)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.118 (0.137)	0.014 (0.163)	0.053 (0.124)
Funds Benefit Community	0.041 (0.137)	0.161 (0.160)	0.003 (0.124)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.037 (0.137)	−0.055 (0.160)	0.059 (0.128)
Funds Split Equally	0.025 (0.141)	−0.127 (0.165)	−0.120 (0.132)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S48. Ghana: Benefit Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.071 (0.139)	0.079 (0.068)	0.131** (0.065)	−0.101 (0.082)	−0.047 (0.069)	0.047 (0.064)	−0.147 (0.193)	0.003 (0.077)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.098 (0.219)	0.108 (0.107)	0.203* (0.105)	−0.170 (0.129)	−0.065 (0.109)	−0.077 (0.101)	−0.249 (0.302)	−0.020 (0.121)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.263 (0.211)	−0.018 (0.104)	0.208** (0.099)	−0.295** (0.128)	−0.119 (0.105)	0.054 (0.100)	−0.231 (0.301)	−0.014 (0.118)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.075 (0.220)	0.016 (0.108)	0.118 (0.103)	0.079 (0.134)	0.147 (0.112)	0.241** (0.100)	−0.356 (0.311)	−0.011 (0.124)
Funds Split Equally	0.001 (0.231)	0.211* (0.112)	−0.006 (0.106)	−0.019 (0.139)	−0.152 (0.115)	−0.028 (0.107)	0.247 (0.318)	0.057 (0.128)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S49. Ghana: Benefit Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.080 (0.079)	0.126 (0.140)	-0.051 (0.079)
Funds Benefit Family	0.140 (0.125)	0.043 (0.220)	-0.129 (0.122)
Funds Benefit Community	0.070 (0.124)	0.006 (0.214)	-0.073 (0.117)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.083 (0.129)	0.141 (0.225)	-0.048 (0.121)
Funds Split Equally	0.026 (0.131)	0.314 (0.231)	0.045 (0.131)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).



**Table S50. Uganda: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.004 (0.108)	0.027 (0.081)	−0.059 (0.075)	−0.103 (0.089)	−0.052 (0.081)	0.070 (0.085)	0.094 (0.133)	−0.002 (0.096)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.045 (0.170)	0.097 (0.129)	−0.109 (0.118)	−0.228 (0.139)	−0.066 (0.129)	−0.065 (0.132)	0.332 (0.215)	−0.025 (0.152)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.108 (0.167)	0.010 (0.129)	−0.060 (0.120)	−0.161 (0.137)	0.102 (0.133)	0.117 (0.133)	−0.006 (0.205)	0.025 (0.150)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.069 (0.173)	0.049 (0.133)	−0.179 (0.119)	−0.169 (0.140)	−0.206 (0.130)	0.005 (0.138)	−0.285 (0.208)	0.197 (0.158)
Funds Split Equally	0.069 (0.178)	−0.047 (0.129)	0.114 (0.125)	0.148 (0.144)	−0.037 (0.132)	0.221 (0.142)	0.336 (0.217)	−0.204 (0.163)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S51. Uganda: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.024 (0.088)	−0.049 (0.103)	−0.081 (0.083)
Funds Benefit Family	0.052 (0.141)	0.183 (0.164)	−0.082 (0.130)
Funds Benefit Community	0.115 (0.138)	0.107 (0.161)	−0.092 (0.126)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.064 (0.139)	−0.126 (0.163)	−0.097 (0.135)
Funds Split Equally	−0.201 (0.142)	−0.362** (0.167)	−0.053 (0.141)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S52. Ghana: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.012 (0.152)	0.020 (0.071)	−0.034 (0.067)	−0.056 (0.087)	0.058 (0.072)	0.069 (0.066)	−0.087 (0.185)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.057 (0.238)	0.082 (0.112)	−0.028 (0.107)	−0.181 (0.141)	0.133 (0.115)	0.004 (0.106)	−0.105 (0.291)
Funds Benefit Community	0.020 (0.231)	0.034 (0.107)	−0.022 (0.104)	−0.260* (0.134)	0.010 (0.110)	−0.002 (0.101)	0.019 (0.286)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.101 (0.240)	−0.040 (0.113)	0.014 (0.107)	0.079 (0.140)	−0.053 (0.115)	0.083 (0.104)	−0.168 (0.294)
Funds Split Equally	−0.111 (0.253)	0.005 (0.116)	−0.101 (0.112)	0.139 (0.143)	0.141 (0.121)	0.191* (0.111)	−0.094 (0.304)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S53. Ghana: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.030 (0.083)	−0.122 (0.127)	0.045 (0.083)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.026 (0.132)	−0.193 (0.199)	0.034 (0.129)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.150 (0.128)	−0.473** (0.193)	0.018 (0.126)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.070 (0.133)	−0.054 (0.204)	0.118 (0.130)
Funds Split Equally	0.126 (0.137)	0.232 (0.209)	0.011 (0.138)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S54. Uganda: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.008 (0.108)	−0.050 (0.080)	0.016 (0.076)	0.012 (0.090)	−0.010 (0.083)	0.061 (0.085)	0.042 (0.132)	0.070 (0.099)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.048 (0.170)	0.007 (0.126)	−0.022 (0.121)	−0.101 (0.140)	0.056 (0.132)	−0.074 (0.134)	−0.010 (0.210)	0.064 (0.160)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.121 (0.167)	−0.034 (0.126)	0.149 (0.119)	−0.031 (0.139)	0.133 (0.137)	0.121 (0.134)	−0.045 (0.204)	0.096 (0.152)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.098 (0.176)	−0.048 (0.129)	−0.094 (0.127)	−0.015 (0.144)	−0.154 (0.132)	0.128 (0.139)	−0.153 (0.210)	0.322** (0.160)
Funds Split Equally	0.298 (0.183)	−0.124 (0.134)	0.033 (0.129)	0.194 (0.149)	−0.075 (0.137)	0.068 (0.146)	0.377* (0.218)	−0.202 (0.162)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S55. Uganda: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.002 (0.088)	−0.048 (0.104)	−0.080 (0.085)
Funds Benefit Family	0.171 (0.141)	0.170 (0.167)	−0.136 (0.132)
Funds Benefit Community	0.075 (0.137)	−0.054 (0.161)	−0.095 (0.129)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.027 (0.141)	−0.071 (0.169)	−0.156 (0.135)
Funds Split Equally	−0.226 (0.146)	−0.235 (0.173)	0.066 (0.145)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S56. Ghana: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.059 (0.155)	-0.059 (0.071)	-0.165** (0.068)	0.045 (0.086)	0.105 (0.071)	0.022 (0.066)	0.060 (0.197)	0.001 (0.077)
Funds Benefit Family	0.040 (0.243)	-0.026 (0.112)	-0.231** (0.109)	-0.011 (0.141)	0.198* (0.114)	0.081 (0.107)	0.143 (0.312)	0.053 (0.122)
Funds Benefit Community	0.283 (0.235)	0.052 (0.108)	-0.229** (0.105)	0.035 (0.131)	0.129 (0.109)	-0.056 (0.102)	0.250 (0.302)	-0.038 (0.119)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	0.026 (0.245)	-0.056 (0.113)	-0.104 (0.109)	-0.0003 (0.136)	-0.200* (0.114)	-0.158 (0.104)	0.187 (0.317)	-0.035 (0.127)
Funds Split Equally	-0.112 (0.257)	-0.207* (0.118)	-0.095 (0.113)	0.158 (0.142)	0.293** (0.119)	0.220** (0.112)	-0.341 (0.324)	0.026 (0.130)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S57. Ghana: Benefit Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.110 (0.084)	−0.248* (0.145)	0.097 (0.084)
Funds Benefit Family	−0.166 (0.133)	−0.237 (0.228)	0.163 (0.132)
Funds Benefit Community	−0.220* (0.130)	−0.480** (0.221)	0.091 (0.127)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.153 (0.135)	−0.195 (0.231)	0.166 (0.132)
Funds Split Equally	0.100 (0.140)	−0.082 (0.239)	−0.035 (0.139)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).



**Table S58. Uganda: Benefit Index NGO Treatment - non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg (1)	Gov Supp (2)	Female (3)	High Type (4)	Low Approval (5)	Low Trust (6)	Noncoeth (7)	Corrupt (8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.051 (0.086)	−0.029 (0.061)	−0.013 (0.058)	−0.088 (0.067)	0.007 (0.061)	0.008 (0.065)	0.072 (0.101)	0.175** (0.075)
Funds Benefit Family	0.210 (0.138)	0.030 (0.097)	0.005 (0.094)	−0.101 (0.110)	0.038 (0.099)	−0.056 (0.104)	0.180 (0.160)	0.227** (0.115)
Funds Benefit Community	0.030 (0.132)	0.015 (0.096)	−0.007 (0.093)	−0.086 (0.106)	−0.008 (0.095)	−0.043 (0.100)	0.181 (0.157)	0.210* (0.122)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.046 (0.142)	−0.131 (0.098)	−0.021 (0.094)	−0.077 (0.107)	0.014 (0.098)	0.098 (0.102)	0.079 (0.161)	0.088 (0.117)
Funds Split Equally	0.010 (0.141)	−0.029 (0.102)	−0.029 (0.097)	−0.089 (0.111)	−0.016 (0.107)	0.032 (0.107)	−0.154 (0.167)	0.177 (0.122)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S59. Uganda: Benefit Index NGO Treatment - non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.080 (0.073)	−0.018 (0.083)	0.099 (0.065)
Funds Benefit Family	0.075 (0.117)	−0.033 (0.135)	0.096 (0.103)
Funds Benefit Community	0.188* (0.112)	0.090 (0.129)	0.219** (0.099)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.014 (0.116)	−0.144 (0.133)	0.009 (0.105)
Funds Split Equally	0.071 (0.120)	0.016 (0.137)	0.071 (0.106)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S60. Ghana: Benefit Index NGO Treatment - non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.008 (0.119)	−0.020 (0.056)	−0.037 (0.053)	0.070 (0.067)	0.026 (0.055)	−0.083 (0.051)	0.149 (0.160)	−0.128** (0.064)
Funds Benefit Family	0.105 (0.186)	0.047 (0.088)	−0.098 (0.087)	0.048 (0.105)	−0.076 (0.088)	−0.147* (0.083)	0.488* (0.250)	−0.132 (0.103)
Funds Benefit Community	0.095 (0.180)	−0.070 (0.085)	−0.088 (0.081)	0.064 (0.104)	0.047 (0.086)	−0.020 (0.079)	0.037 (0.244)	−0.103 (0.097)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.232 (0.188)	−0.201** (0.089)	−0.073 (0.085)	0.137 (0.108)	0.054 (0.088)	0.038 (0.081)	−0.052 (0.255)	−0.135 (0.101)
Funds Split Equally	−0.0002 (0.198)	0.146 (0.092)	0.112 (0.088)	0.030 (0.111)	0.079 (0.092)	−0.205** (0.086)	0.126 (0.269)	−0.142 (0.105)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S61. Ghana: Benefit Index NGO Treatment - non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	-0.025 (0.066)	0.011 (0.112)	0.143** (0.064)
Funds Benefit Family	-0.085 (0.105)	0.055 (0.175)	0.262*** (0.101)
Funds Benefit Community	0.010 (0.105)	0.138 (0.170)	0.356*** (0.096)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	-0.186* (0.106)	-0.334* (0.179)	0.141 (0.101)
Funds Split Equally	0.161 (0.109)	0.183 (0.184)	-0.188* (0.107)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S62. Uganda: Misappropriation Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	-0.203** (0.102)	0.032 (0.072)	-0.046 (0.069)	-0.103 (0.082)	-0.027 (0.071)	0.005 (0.078)	-0.001 (0.113)	-0.039 (0.087)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	-0.104 (0.174)	0.056 (0.130)	-0.083 (0.124)	-0.169 (0.143)	0.022 (0.126)	0.028 (0.136)	-0.015 (0.196)	-0.114 (0.153)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	-0.143 (0.164)	0.100 (0.121)	-0.012 (0.113)	-0.056 (0.140)	-0.014 (0.119)	-0.115 (0.127)	-0.039 (0.185)	-0.081 (0.142)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	-0.362** (0.172)	-0.062 (0.129)	-0.042 (0.124)	-0.084 (0.141)	-0.090 (0.125)	0.102 (0.136)	0.051 (0.203)	0.080 (0.148)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S63. Uganda: Misappropriation Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.072 (0.083)	0.115 (0.096)	0.070 (0.075)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.003 (0.146)	0.075 (0.174)	-0.086 (0.136)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.236* (0.134)	0.315** (0.156)	0.054 (0.124)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	-0.022 (0.140)	-0.044 (0.163)	0.242* (0.126)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S64. Ghana: Misappropriation Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg (1)	Gov Supp (2)	Female (3)	High Type (4)	Low Approval (5)	Low Trust (6)	Noncoeth (7)	Corrupt (8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.180 (0.126)	0.018 (0.061)	−0.013 (0.058)	0.007 (0.074)	−0.157** (0.062)	−0.133** (0.059)	0.181 (0.178)	−0.069 (0.071)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.440* (0.231)	−0.052 (0.110)	−0.032 (0.107)	−0.013 (0.135)	−0.164 (0.113)	−0.199* (0.108)	0.302 (0.341)	−0.019 (0.127)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.025 (0.214)	0.117 (0.104)	−0.124 (0.097)	−0.135 (0.125)	−0.142 (0.105)	−0.049 (0.098)	0.686** (0.295)	−0.166 (0.117)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.077 (0.215)	−0.010 (0.108)	0.117 (0.103)	0.169 (0.133)	−0.164 (0.109)	−0.150 (0.108)	−0.444 (0.299)	−0.022 (0.139)

\*  $p < .1$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S65. Ghana: Misappropriation Index Oil Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.0003 (0.072)	0.162 (0.137)	0.097 (0.069)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.115 (0.139)	0.043 (0.257)	0.122 (0.127)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.025 (0.122)	0.265 (0.216)	0.035 (0.117)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	0.089 (0.124)	0.180 (0.229)	0.134 (0.121)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).



**Table S66. Uganda: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg (1)	Gov Supp (2)	Female (3)	High Type (4)	Low Approval (5)	Low Trust (6)	Noncoeth (7)	Corrupt (8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.049 (0.101)	0.102 (0.074)	−0.030 (0.071)	−0.119 (0.084)	−0.019 (0.076)	−0.037 (0.081)	0.182 (0.123)	−0.145 (0.092)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.036 (0.182)	0.102 (0.130)	−0.058 (0.125)	−0.120 (0.144)	−0.112 (0.135)	−0.081 (0.140)	0.370* (0.217)	−0.167 (0.161)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.028 (0.175)	0.014 (0.124)	0.041 (0.116)	−0.194 (0.136)	0.066 (0.123)	−0.013 (0.133)	0.113 (0.204)	−0.251* (0.149)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.211 (0.175)	0.191 (0.130)	−0.074 (0.125)	−0.041 (0.144)	−0.010 (0.131)	−0.018 (0.140)	0.062 (0.221)	−0.018 (0.167)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S67. Uganda: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.056 (0.083)	0.129 (0.096)	0.004 (0.077)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	-0.039 (0.149)	0.011 (0.173)	0.092 (0.141)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.229* (0.135)	0.265* (0.158)	-0.117 (0.128)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	-0.022 (0.141)	0.111 (0.165)	0.037 (0.133)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S68. Ghana: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.070 (0.135)	0.030 (0.063)	0.034 (0.060)	−0.013 (0.078)	−0.194*** (0.064)	−0.112* (0.060)	0.010 (0.166)	−0.040 (0.074)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.050 (0.245)	0.024 (0.115)	0.025 (0.110)	−0.002 (0.143)	−0.313*** (0.118)	−0.144 (0.110)	−0.352 (0.307)	−0.142 (0.128)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.487** (0.234)	0.084 (0.108)	0.045 (0.102)	−0.046 (0.132)	−0.213* (0.110)	−0.050 (0.102)	0.451 (0.280)	−0.079 (0.121)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.226 (0.236)	−0.019 (0.112)	0.032 (0.106)	0.008 (0.138)	−0.056 (0.114)	−0.142 (0.107)	−0.068 (0.286)	0.101 (0.140)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S69. Ghana: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Aid Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.019 (0.075)	0.105 (0.113)	0.088 (0.073)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.137 (0.140)	0.236 (0.210)	0.063 (0.138)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.024 (0.127)	0.038 (0.194)	0.160 (0.127)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	-0.104 (0.131)	0.042 (0.198)	0.040 (0.127)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S70. Uganda: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Noncoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.154 (0.105)	0.071 (0.075)	0.015 (0.072)	−0.015 (0.083)	0.008 (0.079)	−0.043 (0.082)	0.182 (0.124)	−0.107 (0.096)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.140 (0.188)	0.045 (0.131)	0.025 (0.125)	0.049 (0.148)	−0.134 (0.133)	−0.109 (0.144)	0.385* (0.217)	−0.053 (0.160)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.171 (0.175)	−0.086 (0.124)	0.053 (0.120)	−0.138 (0.142)	0.080 (0.125)	0.102 (0.134)	0.152 (0.204)	−0.170 (0.152)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	0.152 (0.176)	0.253* (0.133)	−0.032 (0.125)	0.043 (0.145)	0.080 (0.139)	−0.120 (0.140)	0.010 (0.219)	−0.098 (0.174)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S71. Uganda: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.017 (0.083)	0.014 (0.097)	−0.066 (0.079)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.042 (0.146)	−0.065 (0.171)	0.178 (0.148)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.007 (0.137)	−0.050 (0.161)	−0.171 (0.130)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.00002 (0.142)	0.156 (0.166)	−0.205 (0.135)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S72. Ghana: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg (1)	Gov Supp (2)	Female (3)	High Type (4)	Low Approval (5)	Low Trust (6)	Noncoeth (7)	Corruption (8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.251* (0.138)	0.011 (0.065)	0.047 (0.060)	−0.020 (0.077)	−0.037 (0.064)	0.020 (0.062)	−0.171 (0.175)	0.029 (0.070)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.390 (0.255)	0.076 (0.116)	0.058 (0.113)	0.011 (0.139)	−0.149 (0.117)	0.054 (0.115)	−0.655** (0.327)	−0.123 (0.128)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	0.512** (0.238)	−0.033 (0.110)	0.169 (0.103)	0.089 (0.130)	−0.071 (0.110)	−0.001 (0.103)	−0.236 (0.300)	0.087 (0.119)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.150 (0.237)	−0.009 (0.119)	−0.085 (0.109)	−0.160 (0.137)	0.108 (0.112)	0.008 (0.107)	0.376 (0.303)	0.123 (0.129)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S73. Ghana: Misappropriation Index Tax Treatment - Oil Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty	Poverty-Gov Supp	Trust NGOs
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.019 (0.078)	−0.057 (0.136)	−0.009 (0.076)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.252* (0.140)	0.193 (0.250)	−0.059 (0.140)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.001 (0.131)	−0.227 (0.221)	0.124 (0.128)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.193 (0.136)	−0.138 (0.238)	−0.094 (0.131)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).



**Table S74. Uganda: Misappropriation Index NGO Treatment - Non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg	Gov Supp	Female	High Type	Low Approval	Low Trust	Nocoeth	Corrupt
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.065 (0.081)	0.008 (0.060)	0.035 (0.055)	0.051 (0.064)	0.071 (0.057)	-0.089 (0.061)	-0.034 (0.095)	-0.028 (0.071)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	-0.083 (0.144)	0.003 (0.103)	-0.017 (0.097)	-0.078 (0.110)	0.136 (0.103)	-0.072 (0.108)	-0.091 (0.178)	-0.117 (0.128)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	-0.051 (0.134)	0.046 (0.096)	0.079 (0.091)	0.031 (0.106)	0.021 (0.096)	-0.066 (0.101)	-0.010 (0.156)	-0.162 (0.115)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	0.329** (0.138)	-0.025 (0.102)	0.043 (0.097)	0.198* (0.111)	0.057 (0.103)	-0.130 (0.103)	-0.001 (0.165)	0.194 (0.125)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S75. Uganda: Misappropriation Index NGO Treatment - Non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	0.071 (0.068)	0.129* (0.078)	−0.091 (0.060)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	0.188 (0.119)	0.250* (0.137)	−0.128 (0.108)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.077 (0.112)	0.007 (0.129)	−0.026 (0.100)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	0.101 (0.118)	0.130 (0.133)	−0.119 (0.101)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

**Table S76. Ghana: Misappropriation Index NGO Treatment - Non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	Oil Reg (1)	Gov Supp (2)	Female (3)	High Type (4)	Low Approval (5)	Low Trust (6)	Noncoeth (7)	Corrupt (8)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.020 (0.105)	0.059 (0.050)	0.057 (0.046)	−0.083 (0.060)	0.011 (0.050)	−0.054 (0.046)	0.267* (0.142)	0.065 (0.057)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.113 (0.193)	0.072 (0.091)	0.101 (0.085)	−0.154 (0.113)	−0.052 (0.091)	−0.008 (0.085)	0.233 (0.260)	−0.085 (0.104)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.067 (0.182)	0.038 (0.086)	0.038 (0.079)	−0.050 (0.103)	0.100 (0.085)	−0.062 (0.080)	0.055 (0.250)	0.216** (0.097)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	0.121 (0.182)	0.065 (0.092)	0.031 (0.081)	−0.045 (0.108)	−0.014 (0.087)	−0.092 (0.081)	0.513** (0.246)	0.063 (0.108)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent resides in a high oil region (Oil Reg), was a government supporter (Gov Supp), is female, had experience paying taxes (High Type), did not approve of recent central government performance (Low Approval), reported low levels of trust in the government (Low Trust), was not a coethnic with the sitting president (Noncoeth), and reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt).

**Table S77. Ghana: Misappropriation Index NGO Treatment - Non-NGO Control (MI, Manipulation Check)**

	High Poverty (1)	Poverty-Gov Supp (2)	Trust NGOs (3)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.059 (0.059)	0.008 (0.099)	−0.064 (0.056)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.068 (0.108)	0.059 (0.184)	−0.052 (0.105)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.033 (0.102)	−0.095 (0.174)	−0.227** (0.096)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.077 (0.103)	0.060 (0.175)	0.087 (0.098)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderations, including whether the respondent reported high levels of poverty in their area (High Poverty), was a government supporter and reported high levels of poverty (Poverty-Gov Supp), and expressed high levels of trust in NGOs (Trust NGOs).

## 10. Randomization Inference: Mass Surveys, Main Results

In this section, we report the main effects using randomization inference. Unlike traditional parametric estimation, which relies on the  $t$  or Normal distribution to establish statistical significance, randomization inference makes no distributional assumptions about the test statistic used. Instead, the distribution used to recover the test statistic's p-value is generated directly from the data. This is accomplished by considering all possible treatment assignment vectors, calculating the test statistic for each, and using these estimates to construct a distribution that represents the range of potential treatment effects that might arise purely from chance alone. In doing so, it accounts for treatment assignment vectors that would be both highly favorable to the experimenters — for example, those in which most or all treated units were also those with high values on the dependent variable of interest — as well as those that would be unfavorable.

Estimates from randomization inference can thus be interpreted similarly to conventional differences estimates, with one critical distinction: the distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis is generated from the data rather than assumed using the normality properties of random variables. We report the estimates using the full unimputed sample. As expected, we find nearly identical results as those reported in Section 6.

**Table S78. Action Index, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Action Index (NMWI)	−0.007 (0.816)	−0.029 (0.283)	0.000 (0.990)	−0.009 (0.761)	0.007 (0.796)	0.020 (0.448)
Create Agency	−0.025 (0.606)	−0.078 (0.132)	0.052 (0.322)	−0.015 (0.735)	0.076 (0.130)	0.062 (0.185)
Willing to Send SMS	0.013 (0.796)	0.025 (0.603)	−0.026 (0.608)	−0.005 (0.919)	−0.038 (0.480)	−0.030 (0.536)
Sent SMS	−0.087 (0.103)	0.035 (0.407)	−0.001 (0.862)	0.007 (0.774)	0.087 (0.106)	−0.027 (0.662)
Donated (Binary)	0.044 (0.408)	−0.033 (0.471)	0.022 (0.669)	−0.044 (0.344)	−0.022 (0.689)	−0.011 (0.845)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	−0.019 (0.706)	−0.100** (0.032)	0.046 (0.368)	−0.026 (0.584)	0.064 (0.181)	0.075 (0.123)
Signed Petition (Any)	−0.019 (0.676)	0.002 (0.965)	−0.059 (0.219)	−0.026 (0.595)	−0.040 (0.443)	−0.028 (0.600)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.025 (0.642)	−0.034 (0.486)	0.018 (0.723)	0.004 (0.922)	−0.006 (0.896)	0.038 (0.443)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	−0.059 (0.245)	−0.057 (0.241)	−0.051 (0.322)	−0.004 (0.932)	0.008 (0.876)	0.053 (0.272)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.066 (0.167)	−0.010 (0.848)	−0.010 (0.836)	0.024 (0.592)	−0.076 (0.142)	0.034 (0.486)

\*  $p < .1$ ; \*\*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .01$

Notes: Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S79. Action Index, NGO Pooled Results, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Action Index (NMWI)	0.036* (0.058)	0.011 (0.538)
Create Agency	0.049 (0.166)	0.009 (0.783)
Willing to Send SMS	−0.025 (0.468)	0.006 (0.822)
Sent SMS	−0.037 (0.257)	−0.009 (0.868)
Donated (Binary)	0.079** (0.022)	−0.072** (0.034)
Taxes Willing to Commit (Binary)	0.049 (0.184)	0.009 (0.813)
Signed Petition (Any)	0.026 (0.433)	0.033 (0.322)
Pr(Contact Village Elder)	0.081** (0.014)	0.044 (0.203)
Pr(Contact Local Official)	0.080** (0.024)	0.027 (0.405)
Pr(Contact MP)	0.016 (0.644)	0.051 (0.122)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S80. Benefit Index, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.007 (0.837)	−0.002 (0.934)	0.018 (0.605)	0.004 (0.900)	0.011 (0.741)	0.006 (0.828)
Funds Benefit Family	0.016 (0.764)	−0.074 (0.138)	0.071 (0.182)	−0.003 (0.960)	0.055 (0.286)	0.071 (0.141)
Funds Benefit Community	0.012 (0.839)	−0.038 (0.417)	0.032 (0.521)	0.020 (0.687)	0.020 (0.675)	0.058 (0.239)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.104** (0.049)	0.064 (0.190)	−0.038 (0.471)	0.044 (0.371)	0.067 (0.193)	−0.020 (0.673)
Funds Split Equally	0.065 (0.208)	0.026 (0.587)	0.003 (0.935)	−0.054 (0.250)	−0.062 (0.226)	−0.079 (0.121)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S81. Benefit Index, NGO Pooled Results, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.025 (0.282)	0.046** (0.033)
Funds Benefit Family	0.055 (0.141)	0.084** (0.015)
Funds Benefit Community	0.021 (0.570)	0.049 (0.165)
Funds Benefit Ordinary People	−0.016 (0.668)	0.106*** (0.002)
Funds Split Equally	0.040 (0.250)	−0.039 (0.267)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates.



**Table S82. Misappropriation Index, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.038 (0.217)	−0.015 (0.591)	0.019 (0.517)	0.014 (0.639)	0.058* (0.051)	0.030 (0.292)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.024 (0.654)	0.046 (0.317)	0.040 (0.417)	0.082* (0.085)	0.064 (0.205)	0.036 (0.443)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.009 (0.839)	−0.049 (0.314)	−0.010 (0.844)	−0.063 (0.191)	0.000 (0.987)	−0.013 (0.784)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.065 (0.229)	−0.018 (0.735)	0.041 (0.449)	0.043 (0.384)	0.106** (0.036)	0.060 (0.206)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S83. Misappropriation Index, NGO Pooled Results, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Misappropriation Index (NMWI)	−0.076*** (0.000)	−0.015 (0.413)
Pr(Used for Clientelism)	−0.118*** (0.001)	−0.025 (0.441)
Pr(Spending Hidden)	−0.037 (0.286)	−0.027 (0.418)
Pr(MP Observes Spending)	−0.073** (0.033)	0.008 (0.813)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates.

## 11. MP Surveys, Samples

We attempted to conduct a census of all current MPs in Uganda and Ghana. Moreover, we also contacted as many former MPs as possible in both countries from the previous parliaments. We solicited MP participation through phone calls which then, if they were willing, lead to appointments to meet them at Parliament. Former MPs were interviewed at a place of their choosing, although that often was in the capital cities because many of them still lived there. Enumerators were assigned to a MP by a project manager based in Kampala and Accra, respectively. Once contact was made, an enumerator would be matched for that MP to set up appointments and make follow up phone calls. If an appointment was canceled, the interview was rescheduled. If several cancellations occurred, the MP would be put back in the pool or, if they asked, labeled “not to be contacted again.”

The Uganda sample includes 200 MPs (133 current MPs from the ninth parliament and 66 former MPs from the eighth parliament). In the table below, we compare our sample in Uganda to the demographic characteristics of the actual ninth parliament in Uganda. Due to enumerator error, we lacked identifying characteristics for 12 MPs in Uganda. While the Uganda MP sample is broadly comparable in terms of its regional distribution, the sample has more men and more independents than the real parliament. We strove to interview only constituency MPs, but some MPs in seats reserved for women were inadvertently interviewed as well.

In Ghana, we surveyed 300 current and former MPs. We find that are sample is broadly comparable to the current MPs in terms of gender, political party affiliation, and region. In our sample, we have fewer MPs from the Greater Accra region than the sixth parliament. Due to enumerator error, we lack identifying characteristics on political party and region for nine MPs.

**Table S84. Uganda Former and Current MPs**

	Sample	9th Parl.
<b>Gender</b>		
% Male	84	65
% Female	16	35
<b>Party</b>		
% NRM	62.5	73.5
% Independents	14.5	11.2
% FDC	9.5	8.8
% DP	4	3.4
% UPC	3	2.6
% CP	0.5	0.3
% Unknown	6	n/a
<b>Region</b>		
% from Central	25	25
% from Eastern	28.5	27
% from Northern	21.5	22
% from Western	25	26
<b>MP Type</b>		
% Constituency MPs	89.5	62
% District Women MPs	4.5	29
% Special Interest MPs	.	7
% Ex-Officio MPs	.	2
% Unknown	6	n/a

**Table S85. Ghana Former and Current MPs**

	Sample	6th Parl.
<b>Gender</b>		
% Male	89.0	89.5
% Female	11.0	10.5
<b>Party</b>		
% NDP	50.7	53.1
% NPP	44.0	45.1
% PNC	0.7	0.4
% CPP	0.3	0.4
% IND	1.3	1.1
% Unknown	3.0	n/a
<b>Region</b>		
% Ashanti	17.0	17.1
% Brong Ahafo	11.3	10.5
% Central	7.7	8.4
% Eastern	11.3	12.0
% Greater Accra	9.0	12.4
% Northern	12.0	11.3
% Upper East	6.0	5.5
% Upper West	4.3	4.0
% Volta	9.0	9.5
% Western	9.3	9.5

## 12. MP Surveys, Main Results

We illustrate below the main findings for government revenues and the NGO condition for the MP survey for all questions used in the benefit and influence indexes.

**Table S86. MP Benefit Index, Enumerator FEs**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.059 (0.055)	−0.064 (0.041)	0.087 (0.055)	−0.024 (0.042)	0.029 (0.058)	0.040 (0.041)
Benefit Index (PCA)	0.231 (0.169)	−0.168 (0.179)	0.267 (0.169)	−0.098 (0.182)	0.036 (0.177)	0.070 (0.180)
Funds benefit family	0.135 (0.084)	−0.062 (0.085)	0.140* (0.084)	−0.064 (0.087)	0.004 (0.088)	−0.002 (0.085)
Funds benefit community	0.028 (0.085)	−0.052 (0.054)	0.039 (0.085)	0.031 (0.055)	0.011 (0.089)	0.083 (0.054)
Funds benefit economy	0.044 (0.056)	−0.040 (0.035)	0.092 (0.056)	−0.041 (0.035)	0.048 (0.058)	−0.001 (0.035)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

Notes: Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S87. Benefit Index, NGO Treatment-Non-NGO Control Results**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.067 (0.048)	−0.021 (0.033)
Benefit Index (PCA)	0.158 (0.150)	−0.189 (0.153)
Funds benefit family	0.034 (0.075)	−0.060 (0.073)
Funds benefit community	0.062 (0.073)	−0.033 (0.044)
Funds benefit economy	0.063 (0.049)	−0.022 (0.028)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S88. MP Influence Index, Enumerator FEs**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.078 (0.056)	−0.025 (0.037)	0.069 (0.057)	0.017 (0.038)	−0.009 (0.060)	0.042 (0.037)
Influence Index (PCA)	0.219 (0.193)	−0.233 (0.158)	0.254 (0.193)	−0.043 (0.162)	0.034 (0.205)	0.190 (0.158)
Important to Track Funds	0.045 (0.058)	0.106 (0.071)	0.006 (0.058)	0.065 (0.072)	−0.039 (0.061)	−0.041 (0.071)
Bring Projects to District	−0.002 (0.088)	−0.004 (0.044)	−0.015 (0.088)	−0.003 (0.044)	−0.013 (0.093)	0.001 (0.044)
Influence Funds	0.135 (0.090)	−0.142* (0.081)	0.155* (0.091)	0.035 (0.083)	0.020 (0.096)	0.177** (0.081)
Observe Spending	0.117 (0.081)	−0.058 (0.052)	0.131 (0.083)	−0.030 (0.052)	0.014 (0.087)	0.028 (0.052)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table S89. Influence Index, NGO Treatment-Non-NGO Control Results**

	Uganda NGO Treatment, Non-NGO Control	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.009 (0.049)	−0.087*** (0.030)
Influence Index (PCA)	0.019 (0.165)	−0.520*** (0.132)
Important to Track Funds	0.015 (0.050)	−0.002 (0.058)
Bring Projects to District	0.044 (0.076)	−0.108*** (0.036)
Influence Funds	−0.009 (0.078)	−0.086 (0.068)
Observe Spending	−0.006 (0.071)	−0.181*** (0.043)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 report the Ghanaian estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.



### 13. MP Surveys, Heterogeneous Effects

For the MPs, we run many of the same subgroups to learn if responses vary across different types of leaders. We look at whether they are in the ruling party or opposition, whether they believe public services in their constituency are good or not, and whether they believe the government is very corrupt. We hoped to examine those who were from oil areas, but their number is too small (only 6 total in Uganda) so we are unable to do this. There are no conventionally significant differences. Null results do not seem to be driven by the key factors assessed by subgroup analysis. MPs just do not see many differences in their influence or the public benefits across the revenue streams.

In this section, we report analysis of heterogeneous effects of subgroups for the Ugandan and Ghanaian MPs. First, we created a indicator for respondents who thought that public services such as electric, the police, roads, water, schools, sewage, and medical care were poor. Moreover, we also used the same series of questions that probe views of corruption as in the mass survey. Specifically, we created an indicator for MPs who thought that “people use government money to benefit [themselves and their families/their political friends and allies].”

**Table S90. Uganda MPs: Benefit Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.310** (0.132)	−0.063 (0.139)	0.140 (0.121)
Funds benefit family	−0.251 (0.201)	−0.040 (0.208)	0.237 (0.182)
Funds benefit community	−0.516** (0.205)	−0.054 (0.220)	0.106 (0.193)
Funds benefit economy	−0.199 (0.135)	−0.268* (0.146)	0.114 (0.124)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S91. Ghana MPs: Benefit Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.074 (0.100)	0.100 (0.097)	0.028 (0.086)
Funds benefit family	0.080 (0.216)	0.161 (0.198)	0.012 (0.179)
Funds benefit community	−0.114 (0.133)	0.034 (0.129)	−0.013 (0.112)
Funds benefit economy	−0.123 (0.085)	0.067 (0.083)	0.056 (0.074)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S92. Uganda MPs: Benefit Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.142 (0.123)	−0.004 (0.143)	0.161 (0.122)
Funds benefit family	−0.253 (0.189)	−0.163 (0.215)	0.424** (0.184)
Funds benefit community	−0.157 (0.192)	0.109 (0.228)	0.180 (0.195)
Funds benefit economy	−0.094 (0.126)	−0.166 (0.150)	−0.007 (0.125)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S93. Ghana MPs: Benefit Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.109 (0.097)	−0.135 (0.104)	0.068 (0.086)
Funds benefit family	−0.117 (0.206)	−0.142 (0.209)	0.108 (0.176)
Funds benefit community	−0.120 (0.130)	−0.140 (0.140)	0.092 (0.112)
Funds benefit economy	−0.075 (0.082)	−0.031 (0.090)	0.021 (0.074)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S94. Uganda MPs: Benefit Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.168 (0.138)	−0.059 (0.136)	−0.020 (0.122)
Funds benefit family	0.002 (0.212)	0.122 (0.205)	−0.187 (0.186)
Funds benefit community	−0.358* (0.213)	−0.164 (0.210)	−0.074 (0.194)
Funds benefit economy	−0.105 (0.142)	−0.102 (0.139)	0.121 (0.124)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S95. Ghana MPs: Benefit Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.035 (0.098)	0.235** (0.098)	−0.040 (0.088)
Funds benefit family	0.197 (0.203)	0.303 (0.206)	−0.096 (0.181)
Funds benefit community	0.006 (0.130)	0.174 (0.132)	−0.105 (0.114)
Funds benefit economy	−0.048 (0.082)	0.098 (0.085)	0.035 (0.075)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S96. Uganda MPs: Benefit Index, NGO Treatment-non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	−0.175 (0.123)	−0.269** (0.130)	0.120 (0.106)
Funds benefit family	−0.003 (0.187)	−0.373* (0.198)	0.192 (0.163)
Funds benefit community	−0.224 (0.189)	−0.322 (0.200)	0.154 (0.166)
Funds benefit economy	−0.262** (0.125)	−0.110 (0.134)	0.003 (0.108)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S97. Ghana MPs: Benefit Index, NGO Treatment-non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.065 (0.082)	0.008 (0.081)	−0.015 (0.070)
Funds benefit family	0.103 (0.176)	0.004 (0.183)	−0.130 (0.151)
Funds benefit community	0.062 (0.108)	0.097 (0.107)	0.018 (0.090)
Funds benefit economy	0.054 (0.069)	−0.100 (0.069)	−0.006 (0.059)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.



**Table S98. Uganda MPs: Influence Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.142 (0.140)	0.061 (0.142)	0.112 (0.127)
Important to Track Funds	0.143 (0.140)	0.022 (0.145)	0.203 (0.134)
Bring Projects to District	0.304 (0.214)	0.298 (0.216)	−0.014 (0.193)
Influence Funds	0.072 (0.221)	−0.114 (0.229)	0.075 (0.204)
Observe Spending	0.041 (0.199)	0.035 (0.206)	0.174 (0.185)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S99. Ghana MPs: Influence Index, Tax Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.023 (0.090)	−0.134 (0.088)	0.014 (0.077)
Important to Track Funds	0.199 (0.172)	−0.202 (0.169)	−0.074 (0.146)
Bring Projects to District	0.076 (0.108)	−0.111 (0.104)	0.047 (0.091)
Influence Funds	−0.271 (0.202)	−0.281 (0.190)	0.086 (0.171)
Observe Spending	0.022 (0.126)	0.056 (0.123)	0.020 (0.108)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S100. Uganda MPs: Influence Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services (1)	High Corruption (2)	Ruling Party (3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	−0.006 (0.131)	0.085 (0.146)	−0.037 (0.129)
Important to Track Funds	0.065 (0.131)	−0.203 (0.150)	0.042 (0.136)
Bring Projects to District	0.047 (0.207)	0.456** (0.230)	−0.194 (0.200)
Influence Funds	−0.073 (0.214)	−0.114 (0.243)	−0.147 (0.207)
Observe Spending	−0.231 (0.186)	0.131 (0.215)	0.142 (0.189)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S101. Ghana MPs: Influence Index, Oil Treatment-Aid Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	−0.057 (0.087)	−0.084 (0.094)	−0.021 (0.077)
Important to Track Funds	0.231 (0.165)	−0.270 (0.181)	−0.242* (0.145)
Bring Projects to District	−0.035 (0.102)	0.016 (0.113)	0.082 (0.091)
Influence Funds	−0.278 (0.189)	−0.194 (0.206)	−0.087 (0.169)
Observe Spending	−0.167 (0.121)	0.071 (0.134)	0.171 (0.108)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S102. Uganda MPs: Influence Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.148 (0.147)	−0.024 (0.139)	0.149 (0.130)
Important to Track Funds	0.078 (0.147)	0.224 (0.143)	0.161 (0.137)
Bring Projects to District	0.257 (0.231)	−0.158 (0.221)	0.180 (0.200)
Influence Funds	0.145 (0.238)	−0.001 (0.232)	0.222 (0.209)
Observe Spending	0.272 (0.209)	−0.096 (0.206)	0.032 (0.191)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S103. Ghana MPs: Influence Index, Tax Treatment-Oil Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.080 (0.088)	−0.050 (0.089)	0.035 (0.078)
Important to Track Funds	−0.032 (0.167)	0.068 (0.170)	0.168 (0.147)
Bring Projects to District	0.111 (0.105)	−0.126 (0.107)	−0.034 (0.093)
Influence Funds	0.007 (0.196)	−0.087 (0.195)	0.173 (0.172)
Observe Spending	0.189 (0.122)	−0.015 (0.126)	−0.151 (0.110)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S104. Uganda MPs: Influence Index, NGO Treatment-non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	−0.065 (0.129)	−0.216 (0.133)	0.034 (0.111)
Important to Track Funds	−0.399*** (0.129)	−0.037 (0.137)	0.119 (0.118)
Bring Projects to District	−0.222 (0.198)	−0.541*** (0.203)	0.172 (0.168)
Influence Funds	0.250 (0.204)	−0.139 (0.215)	−0.008 (0.176)
Observe Spending	0.163 (0.184)	−0.127 (0.193)	−0.137 (0.160)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.

**Table S105. Ghana MPs: Influence Index, NGO Treatment-non-NGO Control, Het. Effects Results**

	Poor Services	High Corruption	Ruling Party
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Influence Index (NMWI)	−0.043 (0.073)	0.136* (0.073)	0.016 (0.062)
Important to Track Funds	0.063 (0.140)	−0.003 (0.141)	0.058 (0.118)
Bring Projects to District	0.004 (0.086)	0.033 (0.090)	−0.091 (0.074)
Influence Funds	−0.141 (0.162)	0.442*** (0.167)	0.115 (0.141)
Observe Spending	−0.050 (0.103)	0.062 (0.107)	−0.009 (0.089)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on Generalized Least Squares with enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Reported estimates are interaction effects that test whether the effect of the treatment varies across potential moderators, including whether the respondent thought there was a poor level of public services in their district (Poor Services), reported high levels of corruption by politicians (Corrupt), and member of the ruling party.



366 **14. Randomization Inference: MP Surveys, Main Results**

367 In this section, we report the main effects for the MP surveys using randomization inference. As we find for the mass surveys,  
 368 we find nearly identical results as those reported in Section 12.

**Table S106. Benefit Index, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana Tax Treat - Oil Ctr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.060 (0.372)	−0.071 (0.105)	0.095 (0.165)	−0.041 (0.379)	0.035 (0.695)	0.030 (0.530)
Funds benefit family	0.159* (0.066)	−0.076 (0.361)	0.192** (0.043)	−0.115 (0.290)	0.033 (0.844)	−0.039 (0.696)
Funds benefit community	0.024 (0.685)	−0.065 (0.348)	0.024 (0.675)	0.014 (1.000)	0.000 (1.000)	0.078 (0.222)
Funds benefit economy	0.030 (0.572)	−0.040 (0.356)	0.070 (0.237)	−0.041 (0.365)	0.040 (0.756)	−0.001 (0.689)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S107. Benefit Index - NGO Treatment, non-NGO Control, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Benefit Index (NMWI)	0.073 (0.143)	−0.029 (0.346)
Funds benefit family	0.031 (0.789)	−0.105 (0.111)
Funds benefit community	0.053 (0.444)	−0.045 (0.319)
Funds benefit economy	0.079* (0.071)	−0.025 (0.418)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S108. Influence Index, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda Oil Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana	Uganda Tax Treat-Aid Ctr	Ghana	Uganda Tax Treat - Oil Ctr	Ghana
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.097* (0.098)	−0.028 (0.401)	0.090 (0.139)	0.011 (0.766)	−0.007 (0.916)	0.039 (0.289)
Important to Track Funds	0.054 (0.321)	0.114 (0.162)	0.010 (0.774)	0.073 (0.384)	−0.044 (0.467)	−0.041 (0.595)
Bring Projects to District	0.022 (0.840)	−0.011 (1.000)	−0.014 (0.857)	−0.014 (1.000)	−0.037 (0.813)	−0.003 (0.717)
Influence Funds	0.175* (0.081)	−0.148* (0.072)	0.210** (0.033)	0.028 (0.834)	0.035 (0.851)	0.176** (0.029)
Observe Spending	0.122 (0.146)	−0.064 (0.211)	0.156* (0.054)	−0.041 (0.484)	0.034 (0.809)	0.023 (0.766)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Columns 1, 3, and 5 report the Ugandan results while Columns 2, 4, and 6 report the Ghanaian estimates.

**Table S109. Influence Index - NGO Treatment, non-NGO Control, Randomization Inference**

	Uganda	Ghana
	(1)	(2)
Influence Index (NMWI)	0.017 (0.722)	−0.083*** (0.002)
Important to Track Funds	0.008 (1.000)	0.017 (0.778)
Bring Projects to District	0.036 (0.542)	−0.112*** (0.000)
Influence Funds	0.004 (1.000)	−0.084 (0.167)
Observe Spending	0.027 (0.647)	−0.184*** (0.000)

\*p < .1; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\*p < .01

*Notes:* Estimates are based on randomization inference with two-tailed p-values in parentheses. Column 1 reports the Ugandan results while Column 2 reports the Ghanaian estimates.

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